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Tintin

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About Tintin

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  • Data de Nascimento
    01/01/1900

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  1. Errar todo mundo erra, independente da maneira como a performance de decolagem é calculada. Alguns sistemas por ACARS são ótimos, mas sempre tem algo que pode dar errado. O que vai garantir a segurança da operação é a disciplina dos pilotos. Se tudo for feito de acordo com os SOPs, em algum momento o erro vai ser detectado e corrigido.
  2. Saiu o relatório final, no avherald também tem o vídeo/animação do acidente: http://avherald.com/h?article=4be42f25/0000&opt=0
  3. Sem saber se tem alguma relação com os aviões da TAP, mas teve esse caso aqui da Spirit. Na notícia do avherald tem alguns links para estudos e pesquisas interessantes sobre o assunto: http://avherald.com/h?article=4b6eb830/0006&opt=0
  4. “The aircraft remained largely stable on the approach – performed in a crosswind from the left of up to 30kt – with an airspeed of 155-160kt. As the Superjet descended through 1,100-900ft above ground, the crew received five predictive windshear “go around” warnings.” Com pelo menos cinco aeroportos ao redor de Moscou, tentar uma aproximação em Sheremetyevo nessas condições não parece ter sido a melhor decisão...
  5. https://aviation-safety.net/database/events/dblist.php?Event=WXL
  6. Sem querer apontar o dedo pros pilotos, porque era uma situação muito complexa: Eles demoraram um pouco pra acionar o Stab Trim Cutout switch, talvez surpresos com o stick shaker e com o comportamento errático do avião. O comandante tentou acoplar o piloto automatico três vezes e foi voando o avião como numa subida normal, mas brigando com o MCAS. Quando finalmente o co-piloto sugeriu “stab trim cut out”, a velocidade ja se aproximava da VMO. Com as altas forças aerodinâmicas e o estabilizador longe da posição ideal pra aquela velocidade, o co-piloto não conseguiu mover-lo manualmente. A velocidade excedeu a VMO, tornou a situação ainda mais difícil. Como último recurso, provavelmente, eles religaram o Stab Trim - o FDR não grava a posição do Stab Trim Cutout Switch - pra tentar controlar o avião, mas após um pequeno movimento de nariz pra cima, o MCAS voltou a atuar e colocou a avião numa descida de 40 graus de pitch irrecuperável. Pra quem perguntou sobre a dificuldade de “trimar” manualmente, tá no FCTM: “Excessive air loads on the stabilizer may require effort by both pilots to correct mis-trim. In extreme cases it may be necessary to aerodynamically relieve the air loads to allow manual trimming. Accelerate or decelerate towards the in-trim speed while attempting to trim manually." Ou seja, em algumas situações o cara tem que ser praticamente um Chuck Yeager da vida pra recuperar o avião. Novamente, não estou culpando os pilotos, a falha está na engenharia da Boeing. Só tentando descrever a perda de controle e porque ao contrário do que a Boeing disse, isso não é um simples caso de Runway Stabiliser.
  7. São quatro empresas, também tem a Air Hong Kong que faz o transporte pra DHL na Ásia. De longe a que mais dá lucro entre todas elas.
  8. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/27/pakistan-india-jets-shot-down-airstrikes-kashmir Pakistan has conducted airstrikes over the ceasefire line in disputed Kashmir and claims to have shot down two Indian jets that responded by entering Pakistani airspace, capturing both of the pilots. India confirmed that one of its pilots is missing in action and said it shot down one of the Pakistani jets as it escaped over the heavily militarised border separating the two nuclear powers. The skirmishes, a day after India flew sorties into Pakistan for the first time in nearly 50 years, are steep escalations in the most serious military crisis in south Asia since the pair fought a brief war in the Himalayas in 1999. Pakistan has released footage purportedly showing one of the captured Indian pilots, a wing commander who gave his name as Abhinandan. His uniform was bloody and a rag was tied around his head. He gave his name, service number, rank and religion, but when asked for more, replied: Im sorry sir, thats all Im supposed to tell you. The countrys armed forces spokesman Major-General Asif Ghafoor said one pilot was being interrogated and the second was injured and being treated in hospital. India said it was aware that Pakistani had claimed to have one pilot in its custody. We are ascertaining the facts, the spokesman for Indias foreign ministry, Raveesh Kumar, told journalists in Delhi. The dogfights on Wednesday morning the first publicly acknowledged between the two countries since 1971 have shut down commercial flights across Pakistan and north India. Flight radar images showed deserted airspace over both countries. All commercial airports in Pakistan have been shut along with eight major Indian airports including those in Jammu city, Srinagar and Amritsar. In Srinagar, the capital of disputed Kashmir, a work crew could be seen painting a large red cross on the top of Shri Maharaja Hari Singh hospital, marking it out as a medical facility from above. Pakistans foreign ministry said in a statement on Wednesday morning that it had struck non-military target across the ceasefire line in Kashmir without entering Indian airspace to demonstrate its right, will and capability for self defence. We have no intention of escalation, but are fully prepared to do so if forced into that paradigm, said Mohammad Faisal, the foreign affairs ministrys spokesman. Ghafoor told a media briefing on Wednesday afternoon Pakistan struck six targets on the Indian side of the ceasefire line, ensuring they kept a safe distance away from civilian, administrative or military sites. When PAF [Pakistan Air Force] took targets, IAFs [indian Air Force] two planes violated the line of control and entered Pakistan, he said. PAF was ready, there was an engagement and as a result both Indian planes were shot down. One wreckage fell on our side and another wreckage fell on their side. He told the Guardian after the briefing that Pakistan had not entered Indian airspace. We want to send the message that we have the ability to strike, the capability for self defence, but in the way of a responsible nation, he said. But India rejected his account. [Pakistan] used its air force to target military installation on the Indian side, Kumar said. Due to a high state of readiness and alertness Pakistans attempt were foiled successfully. The Pakistan air force was a detected and the Indian air force responded instantly. In that aerial engagement one Pakistan fighter airplane was shot down by a MiG 21 Bison of the Indian air force. The Pakistan airplane was seen by ground forces falling from the sky on the Pakistan side. Pakistan has denied losing an aircraft in the mornings engagements. Another Indian aircraft crashed about 150km away in Budgam district on Wednesday, killing at least one person aboard, but it was unrelated to the fighting. India has been on high alert since Tuesdays strikes, an operation Islamabad promised to repay with its own surprise attack. Fighter jets patrolled the skies above Srinagar, the capital of disputed Kashmir, throughout Tuesday night as India and Pakistan traded mortar fire a few hundred miles away at the ceasefire border. The US secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, issued a statement largely supportive of India, characterising its incursion five miles into neighbouring territory a counter terrorism action and calling on Pakistan to take meaningful action against terrorist groups operating on its soil. There are still significant questions over what, if anything, was struck by Indias fighter jets in the early hours of Tuesday morning. Both countries agree that Indian jets made it to within at least a few miles of Balakot, a small city about five miles inside Pakistani territory. But accounts diverge from there. India claims it hit a militant training camp and killed a very large number of fighters from the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) group, which took responsibility for a 14 February suicide bombing in Indian-controlled Kashmir that killed 40 paramilitaries. Pakistan says the Indian fighters were confronted before they could reach Balakot and dropped four to five bombs in an open field as they fled back across the border. Both countries mounted media blitzes to push their particular narrative but had appeared to leave room to de-escalate the conflict. On Wednesday morning, Indias external affairs minister, Sushma Swaraj, emphasised that Pakistans military was not the target of the sorties. No military installations were targeted, Swaraj said. The limited objective of the pre-emptive strike was to act decisively against the terrorist infrastructure of the JeM in order to pre-empt another terrorist attack in India. She added: India does not wish see further escalation of the situation and India will continued to act with responsibility and restraint. Pakistan is holding a joint session of parliament on Wednesday afternoon followed by a meeting of the National Command Authority, whose responsibilities include overseeing the countrys nuclear arsenal. It is your turn now to wait and get ready for our surprise, Ghafoor said on Tuesday night. Both armies accused the other of shelling villages and opposition army posts across the line of control that separates Indian and Pakistani controlled Kashmir. A Pakistani police official told the Associated Press that six people were killed by Indian mortar attacks. Indian security officials did not report any casualties but said villages were hit including Kamalkote and Kalgo, both near the heavily guarded military border. Two militants allegedly belonging to JeM were shot dead in Indian-controlled Kashmir Shopain district on Wednesday morning, in the fourth counter-insurgency operation since a car laden with explosives was detonated by an Indian paramilitary convoy, sparking the latest round of tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbours. Markets and shops across Kashmir were shut on Wednesday in protest at the arrests of hundreds of separatist activists and leaders in the days before Tuesdays military operations.
  9. http://prevencao.potter.net.br/detalhe/67142/PRAVC http://avherald.com/h?article=4adb644e&opt=0 CENIPA analysed: On 18JUL2017, the previous day of the serious incident, LOC-ILM, which marked the ILS procedure for SBGL threshold 28, presented intermittent breakdowns that culminated in the operation removal of the aid and in the issuance of a NOTAM informing about the temporary unavailability of that locator. So, considering that the prevailing wind at Galeão in the morning of 19JUL2017 favored the landing operation on runway 28 and that the ILS procedure for that threshold was unavailable, the procedure adopted was the RNAV Y RWY 28. According to the pilots, a complete approach briefing was carried out, considering the execution of the RNAV procedure in the FINAL APP mode, which would allow the aircraft automatism to perform lateral and vertical navigation (LNAV / VNAV) up to 417ft DA. In this way, the pilots configured the aircraft so that it fulfilled the slope and approach axis profiles prevised in the chart for LNAV / VNAV type operation. In this case, the autopilot would comply with all Stepdown Fixes and the aural warning system would inform the crew when the aircraft was in the DA (Minimum warning) and 100ft above this altitude (Hundred above warning), that should have been inserted in the FMGC. Before authorizing the commencement of the procedure for the PR-AVC crew, APPRJ had to command a series of vectors and holdings, in order to provide traffic separations, since some aircraft were not able to land on Galeão (due to meteorology) and controllers needed to safely reposition all aircraft within the terminal. CENIPA analysed that the approach charts in Brazil provide for minimas in both ceiling as well as visbility. However, a new regulation had come into effect less than a month before the occurrence requiring towers to suspend arrivals only in case of visibility dropping below limits, but no longer suspend arrivals due to ceilings dropping below minima. Tower had announced that approaches were suspended based on ceiling however, a few minutes later realized the new regulation and announced that approaches were possible again with ceilings at 300 feet (400 feet required for the RNAV Y procedure) and 2500 meters visibility. Another aircraft performed the approach and landed successfully, tower subsequently queried O6-6284 whether they wanted to perform the approach adding that one aircraft had just landed. CENIPA wrote: When considering this context, it is possible that the information reported by the air traffic controller has influenced the pilots decision, leading them to choose, possibly in an impulsive way, by the attempt to approach. This hypothesis is reinforced by the phraseology used, in which the use of the word "then" can be considered an indication that, at that moment, the successful landing of the other aircraft consisted of one of the decision factors. In deciding to try the procedure, the pilots no longer complied with the DOP 28/17 of the airline, which provided that, within the company, the ceiling limits still laid down in the current charters should be respected. However, despite this guideline on the part of the company, some pilots of that airline, as identified during the investigation process did not know such information. CENIPA continued analysis later into the approach: As already mentioned, the pilots had previously established, in briefing, that they would carry out the procedure in the FINAL APP mode. However, shortly after passing over the final approach FIX (FAF) of the procedure, the commander selected the Vertical Speed (V/S) mode, which caused the aircraft to exit the managed/managed FINAL APP condition and operate in the managed/selected condition (in this case, with V/S connected). When commanding the Vertical Speed mode, the commander became responsible for maintaining the aircraft slope (vertical navigation), manually controlling the desired descent rate for that approach. The use of V/S mode was not contemplated in the company's FCOM as one of the guidelines allowed in the execution of RNAV procedures. According to the cross-reference table shown in Figure 13, the guidance modes authorized using LNAV navigation were only the FINAL APP (recommended) or NAV FPA. When modifying the approach strategy, the crew also modified the type of procedure, which became different from the one that had been combined in a briefing, and that had already been configured in the aircraft. With the V/S mode connected, the aircraft would no longer comply with the LNAV / VNAV approach profile to perform only the LNAV profile. Consequently, the decision altitude (DA) of 417ft would be replaced by the minimum descent altitude (MDA) of 470ft, and the crew would be responsible for meeting the intermediate descent restrictions provided in the chart (Stepdown Fixes), generating a work overload. According to information obtained by the Investigation Team, the commanders intention when manually commanding a descent rate using the V/S mode would be to perform the dive and drive technique, in order to achieve visual conditions in a position prior to that expected, if it kept a constant rate of descent. However, considering the reality of the SBGL RNAV Y RWY 28 procedure, the use of the dive and drive technique would not bring any operational gain to that crew, since, firstly, the "dive" from the FAF would be restricted to altitude of 660ft in Stepdown Fix GL083. Second, when deciding to reduce the automatism of vertical navigation, the crew consequently proceeded to perform a LNAV-only procedure. Therefore, the lowest point of the procedure was no longer a 417ft DA and became a 470ft MDA. Thirdly, the crew caused an overload of work, by taking command of the rate of descent and compliance with the respective restrictions, whereas the same pilots could monitor the approach if the aircraft was in the managed/managed condition. Therefore, such circumstances led to a greater demand for attention and demanded high levels of situational awareness. This scenario of overloading was aggravated by the lack of a detailed briefing. Finally, because it was a direct approach, in which the runway would be aligned with the final approach, there would be no need to establish a specific trajectory (drive) to the runway alignment. The CENIPA analysed: among the parameters that were not followed by the crew, it was observed in the analysis of QAR data that: - there was a descent rate greater than 1000ft / min; and - there was a vertical deviation (V/DEV) greater than ½ dot during the RNAV approach. In this context, the crew should have immediately initiated a go-around procedure. However, the aircraft continued up to 295ft of barometric altitude. Thus, the decision to perform a go-around procedure, although correct, was late, since the safety limits established in the approach chart had already been exceeded. CENIPA analysed that the crew did not initiate a GPWS escape maneouver following the two GPWS warnings "Too Low, Terrain!" and wrote: According to what has been found, the crew reported that they did not carry out the procedures mentioned, because they interpreted it as an EGPWS caution type message and the above procedure should be used just in case of a warning message. In that context, according to the crew, the evasive maneuver should only be performed in the case of a Pull Up warning! However, this interpretation was misleading in the light of two aspects: 1) the emergency procedure in FCOM makes clear that the maneuver should be performed in the case of EGPWS CAUTIONS and also explained the TOO LOW TERRAIN alarm, as highlighted in Figure 20; and 2) in the condition that the aircraft was, the EGPWS operated in the Terrain Clearance Floor Mode, consequently the Pull Up! warning was inhibited. Taking into account that the go-around procedure was initiated prior to the EGPWS warning, the consequences of non-execution of the evasive maneuver provided in FCOM were not more severe. On the other hand, the misunderstanding of the crew could have catastrophic consequences if, in another scenario, they waited for the Pull Up! warning to react according to the emergency procedure described in the manual. CENIPA stated as last sentence of the analysis: "Failure to analyze data from voice and flight recorders may have hampered further research."
  10. Não houve perda de controle lateral, houve stick-shaker e comando de trim para baixar o nariz. Também não voaram em Manual Reversion (algo ligado a pane hidráulica), somente desativaram o comando elétrico do stabilizer trim através de um switch, o que obviamente desabilita o piloto automático e requer ajuste manual do stabilizer.
  11. Nao vi nem no video nem no texto da noticia original nada sobre relatorio da PF. O laudo sugerindo sabotagem foi feito por um "especialista" contratado pela familia do Eduardo Campos. Conforme o link abaixo, o laudo da PF nao aponta causa criminosa: http://ultimosegundo.ig.com.br/politica/2018-08-07/aviao-eduardo-campos-causas.html
  12. Nasci em Porto Velho e como minha familia eh de Sao Paulo, tive a oportunidade de viajar nessa rota nos B737-200 da Cruzeiro (tambem na Vasp e Varig) nos anos 80. Gostaria que o autor soubesse que fiquei emocionado ao ler o FR, lembrar daquelas curvas sobre o Rio Madeira, daquelas longos voos para Cuiaba em que eu ficava grudado na janela observando a Amazonia, vendo as rotas na revista de bordo e apreciando o safety card. A primeira vez que vi uma cabine foi durante uma descida para PVH pela Cruzeiro, durou poucos minutos, mas foi o bastante pra eu saber o que "iria ser quando crescer". Aqueles "relojinhos" estao na minha memoria ate hoje, toda vez que eu vou voar eu lembro deles. Obrigado B737-200, obrigado Cruzeiro.
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