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Gteixeira08

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  1. *CHINA'S COMAC VOICED INFORMAL INTEREST IN EMBRAER: REUTERS
  2. A Copa é estatal? Minha opinião sobre o assunto: O Canadá um pais muito mais rico e com melhor educação que o Brasil não conseguiu manter o programa comercial da Bombardie, de onde a Embraer vai tirar dinheiro pra concorrer com Airbus/Bombardier, China, Rússia e possivelmente Japão?
  3. Pilots on a Republic Airways Services Inc. flight leaving Atlanta in November lost the ability to raise and lower their Embraer SA EMB-175’s nose, investigators said on Wednesday, a failure reminiscent of what helped lead to the two deadly 737 Max crashes. The National Transportation Safety Board issued 10 recommendations to Brazil, where the jet was made, and U.S. aviation regulators. One of the issues was that the emergency procedures followed by the pilots, who were operating the flight for American Airlines Group Inc., didn’t seem to immediately stop the problem, the NTSB said. The failure was also difficult for pilots to detect, a situation which occurred in the 737 Max crashes that killed 346 people. The regional jet carrying six passengers and four crew members had just lifted off when the captain noticed the plane was trying to aggressively pull the nose up into a climb. The captain and copilot followed an emergency procedure they’d memorized for the problem, but it didn’t correct the problem, the NTSB said. The pilots reported that they both needed to push the control column with two hands to maintain control of the plane, preventing them from reaching for their emergency checklists. Thumb Switch Eventually, the copilot was able to use a thumb switch to help keep the jet’s nose level, and they returned for a safe landing, NTSB said. While the Boeing Co. 737 Max crashes involved a separate failure involving software, it also caused what’s known as the pitch trim system on the plane to malfunction. In those cases, it was driving the nose down and pilots weren’t able to diagnose the issue and disconnect the motor that was causing it. Investigations into those crashes also raised concerns about emergency procedures. Read More: Four Seconds to Respond? Faulty Assumptions Led to 737 Disasters In the Atlanta incident, NTSB investigators found the captain’s thumb switch that adjusts the trim -- which would raise and lower the nose -- had been installed upside down. That could cause a situation in which attempts to lower the nose would actually cause it to go up instead. Chafed Wires The NTSB said it also found evidence of chafed wires in the system controlling the trim on the plane. Such chafing could trigger a short circuit, leading to a trim failure. The NTSB didn’t say whether either of these issues caused the problems the pilots encountered. Embraer said in a statement that since 2015 it has told operators of the plane to modify the switch so that it couldn’t be installed improperly. It has also advised airlines to inspect for damaged wiring, the company said. Representatives of Republic didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment. The safety board called on Brazil’s National Civil Aviation Agency and the Federal Aviation Administration to mandate inspections for similar wiring problems, require Embraer’s switch repair, and to examine whether the plane’s emergency checklist needs to be revised. It applies to several similar models, the EMB-170, EMB-175, EMB-190 and EMB-195.
  4. A window of a brand new Turkish Airlines Boeing 787-9 has melted during a photo shoot During a photo shoot of an aircraft, one window from the Business Class section of Turkish Airlines new aircraft melted from extreme heat. The Boeing 787-9 Dreamliner (reg. TC-LLA) was delivered only a few days ago. According to sources, a spotlight was pointing straight at it for 6 hours at a close distance. The window could not withstand the high temperature. Boeing representatives were sent to Istanbul to investigate. Commercial debut is still planned for July 8th, from Istanbul to Antalya. Fonte: https://www.airlive.net/a-window-of-a-brand-new-turkish-airlines-boeing-787-9-has-melted-during-a-photo-shoot/
  5. Boeing’s 737 Max Software Outsourced to $9-an-Hour Engineers Planemaker and suppliers used lower-paid temporary workers Engineers feared the practice meant code wasn’t done right It remains the mystery at the heart of Boeing Co.’s 737 Max crisis: how a company renowned for meticulous design made seemingly basic software mistakes leading to a pair of deadly crashes. Longtime Boeing engineers say the effort was complicated by a push to outsource work to lower-paid contractors. The Max software -- plagued by issues that could keep the planes grounded months longer after U.S. regulators this week revealed a new flaw -- was developed at a time Boeing was laying off experienced engineers and pressing suppliers to cut costs. Increasingly, the iconic American planemaker and its subcontractors have relied on temporary workers making as little as $9 an hour to develop and test software, often from countries lacking a deep background in aerospace -- notably India. In offices across from Seattle’s Boeing Field, recent college graduates employed by the Indian software developer HCL Technologies Ltd. occupied several rows of desks, said Mark Rabin, a former Boeing software engineer who worked in a flight-test group that supported the Max. The coders from HCL were typically designing to specifications set by Boeing. Still, “it was controversial because it was far less efficient than Boeing engineers just writing the code,” Rabin said. Frequently, he recalled, “it took many rounds going back and forth because the code was not done correctly.” Boeing’s cultivation of Indian companies appeared to pay other dividends. In recent years, it has won several orders for Indian military and commercial aircraft, such as a $22 billion one in January 2017 to supply SpiceJet Ltd. That order included 100 737-Max 8 jets and represented Boeing’s largest order ever from an Indian airline, a coup in a country dominated by Airbus. Based on resumes posted on social media, HCL engineers helped develop and test the Max’s flight-display software, while employees from another Indian company, Cyient Ltd., handled software for flight-test equipment. Costly DelayIn one post, an HCL employee summarized his duties with a reference to the now-infamous model, which started flight tests in January 2016: “Provided quick workaround to resolve production issue which resulted in not delaying flight test of 737-Max (delay in each flight test will cost very big amount for Boeing).” Boeing said the company did not rely on engineers from HCL and Cyient for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which has been linked to the Lion Air crash last October and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster in March. The Chicago-based planemaker also said it didn’t rely on either firm for another software issue disclosed after the crashes: a cockpit warning light that wasn’t working for most buyers. “Boeing has many decades of experience working with supplier/partners around the world,” a company spokesman said. “Our primary focus is on always ensuring that our products and services are safe, of the highest quality and comply with all applicable regulations.” In a statement, HCL said it “has a strong and long-standing business relationship with The Boeing Company, and we take pride in the work we do for all our customers. However, HCL does not comment on specific work we do for our customers. HCL is not associated with any ongoing issues with 737 Max.” Recent simulator tests by the Federal Aviation Administration suggest the software issues on Boeing’s best-selling model run deeper. The company’s shares fell this week after the regulator found a further problem with a computer chip that experienced a lag in emergency response when it was overwhelmed with data. Engineers who worked on the Max, which Boeing began developing eight years ago to match a rival Airbus SE plane, have complained of pressure from managers to limit changes that might introduce extra time or cost. “Boeing was doing all kinds of things, everything you can imagine, to reduce cost, including moving work from Puget Sound, because we’d become very expensive here,” said Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing flight controls engineer laid off in 2017. “All that’s very understandable if you think of it from a business perspective. Slowly over time it appears that’s eroded the ability for Puget Sound designers to design.” Rabin, the former software engineer, recalled one manager saying at an all-hands meeting that Boeing didn’t need senior engineers because its products were mature. “I was shocked that in a room full of a couple hundred mostly senior engineers we were being told that we weren’t needed,” said Rabin, who was laid off in 2015. Boeing could take three more months to fix the latest software glitch on the 737 Max, its best-selling model. The typical jetliner has millions of parts -- and millions of lines of code -- and Boeing has long turned over large portions of the work to suppliers who follow its detailed design blueprints. Starting with the 787 Dreamliner, launched in 2004, it sought to increase profits by instead providing high-level specifications and then asking suppliers to design more parts themselves. The thinking was “they’re the experts, you see, and they will take care of all of this stuff for us,” said Frank McCormick, a former Boeing flight-controls software engineer who later worked as a consultant to regulators and manufacturers. “This was just nonsense.” Sales are another reason to send the work overseas. In exchange for an $11 billion order in 2005 from Air India, Boeing promised to invest $1.7 billion in Indian companies. That was a boon for HCL and other software developers from India, such as Cyient, whose engineers were widely used in computer-services industries but not yet prominent in aerospace. Rockwell Collins, which makes cockpit electronics, had been among the first aerospace companies to source significant work in India in 2000, when HCL began testing software there for the Cedar Rapids, Iowa-based company. By 2010, HCL employed more than 400 people at design, development and verification centers for Rockwell Collins in Chennai and Bangalore. That same year, Boeing opened what it called a “center of excellence” with HCL in Chennai, saying the companies would partner “to create software critical for flight test.” In 2011, Boeing named Cyient, then known as Infotech, to a list of its “suppliers of the year” for design, stress analysis and software engineering on the 787 and the 747-8 at another center in Hyderabad. The Boeing rival also relies in part on offshore engineers. In addition to supporting sales, the planemakers say global design teams add efficiency as they work around the clock. But outsourcing has long been a sore point for some Boeing engineers, who, in addition to fearing job losses say it has led to communications issues and mistakes. Moscow MistakesBoeing has also expanded a design center in Moscow. At a meeting with a chief 787 engineer in 2008, one staffer complained about sending drawings back to a team in Russia 18 times before they understood that the smoke detectors needed to be connected to the electrical system, said Cynthia Cole, a former Boeing engineer who headed the engineers’ union from 2006 to 2010. “Engineering started becoming a commodity,” said Vance Hilderman, who co-founded a company called TekSci that supplied aerospace contract engineers and began losing work to overseas competitors in the early 2000s. U.S.-based avionics companies in particular moved aggressively, shifting more than 30% of their software engineering offshore versus 10% for European-based firms in recent years, said Hilderman, an avionics safety consultant with three decades of experience whose recent clients include most of the major Boeing suppliers. With a strong dollar, a big part of the attraction was price. Engineers in India made around $5 an hour; it’s now $9 or $10, compared with $35 to $40 for those in the U.S. on an H1B visa, he said. But he’d tell clients the cheaper hourly wage equated to more like $80 because of the need for supervision, and he said his firm won back some business to fix mistakes. HCL, once known as Hindustan Computers, was founded in 1976 by billionaire Shiv Nadar and now has more than $8.6 billion in annual sales. With 18,000 employees in the U.S. and 15,000 in Europe, HCL is a global company and has deep expertise in computing, said Sukamal Banerjee, a vice president. It has won business from Boeing on that basis, not on price, he said: “We came from a strong R&D background.” Still, for the 787, HCL gave Boeing a remarkable price – free, according to Sam Swaro, an associate vice president who pitched HCL’s services at a San Diego conference sponsored by Avionics International magazine in June. He said the company took no up-front payments on the 787 and only started collecting payments based on sales years later, an “innovative business model” he offered to extend to others in the industry. The 787 entered service three years late and billions of dollars over budget in 2011, in part because of confusion introduced by the outsourcing strategy. Under Dennis Muilenburg, a longtime Boeing engineer who became chief executive in 2015, the company has said that it planned to bring more work back in-house for its newest planes. Engineer BackwaterThe Max became Boeing’s top seller soon after it was offered in 2011. But for ambitious engineers, it was something of a “backwater,” said Peter Lemme, who designed the 767’s automated flight controls and is now a consultant. The Max was an update of a 50-year-old design, and the changes needed to be limited enough that Boeing could produce the new planes like cookie cutters, with few changes for either the assembly line or airlines. “As an engineer that’s not the greatest job,” he said. Rockwell Collins, now a unit of United Technologies Corp., won the Max contract for cockpit displays, and it has relied in part on HCL engineers in India, Iowa and the Seattle area. A United Technologies spokeswoman didn’t respond to a request for comment. Contract engineers from Cyient helped test flight test equipment. Charles LoveJoy, a former flight-test instrumentation design engineer at the company, said engineers in the U.S. would review drawings done overnight in India every morning at 7:30 a.m. “We did have our challenges with the India team,” he said. “They met the requirements, per se, but you could do it better.” Multiple investigations – including a Justice Department criminal probe – are trying to unravel how and when critical decisions were made about the Max’s software. During the crashes of Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines planes that killed 346 people, investigators suspect, the MCAS system pushed the planes into uncontrollable dives because of bad data from a single sensor. That design violated basic principles of redundancy for generations of Boeing engineers, and the company apparently never tested to see how the software would respond, Lemme said. “It was a stunning fail,” he said. “A lot of people should have thought of this problem – not one person – and asked about it.” Boeing also has disclosed that it learned soon after Max deliveries began in 2017 that a warning light that might have alerted crews to the issue with the sensor wasn’t installed correctly in the flight-display software. A Boeing statement in May, explaining why the company didn’t inform regulators at the time, said engineers had determined it wasn’t a safety issue. “Senior company leadership,” the statement added, “was not involved in the review.” Fonte https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers
  6. Boeing Ordered to Replace 737 Wing Parts Prone to Cracking Manufacturer discovered issue and reported it to U.S. FAA As many as 312 planes worldwide must get emergency checks Airlines worldwide must inspect 312 of Boeing Co.’s 737 family of aircraft, including some of the grounded 737 Max, because they have wing components that are prone to cracking and must be repaired within 10 days, U.S. aviation regulators said Sunday. Boeing informed the Federal Aviation Administration that so-called leading edge slat tracks may not have been properly manufactured and pose a safety risk, the agency said in an emailed statement. The parts allow the wing to expand to create more lift during takeoff and landing. The FAA plans to issue an order calling for operators of the planes worldwide to identify whether the deficient parts were installed and to replace them, if needed. A complete failure wouldn’t lead to a loss of the aircraft, the FAA said, but could cause damage during flight. Boeing has notified operators of the planes about the needed repairs and is sending replacement parts to help minimize the time aircraft are out of service, the company said in a statement. The slat tracks in question were made by a supplier to Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc., Boeing said in an email. Boeing has identified 148 parts made by a subcontractor that are affected. The parts may be on a total of 179 737 Max aircraft and 133 737 NG planes worldwide, including 33 Max and 32 NG aircraft in the U.S., the FAA said. The NG, or Next Generation, 737s are a predecessor to the Max family. The deficient parts may be on fewer of the identified planes, Boeing said. While the full number of jets must be inspected, 20 Max and 21 NG aircraft are “most likely” to have the suspect parts installed, according to the company. The 737 Max has been grounded worldwide since March 13 after two fatal crashes tied to a malfunction that caused a flight control system to repeatedly drive down the plane’s nose. Boeing is finalizing a software fix along with proposed new training that will be required before the planes fly again. Fonte: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-02/boeing-ordered-to-replace-737-wing-components-prone-to-cracking
  7. 4 pessoas total, ou seja, 1 ou 2 pilotos + 2 ou 3 passageiros.
  8. Mais o principal motivo da compra do CSeries pela Airbus foi por que Boeing consegui fazer o governo americano taxar em 300% os aviões que a Delta tinha comprado, após o CSeries vencer a disputa com o 737-700. Transferindo a produção para fabrica deles no Alabama eles conseguiriam evitar de pagar essa tarifa absurda. Esse pedido da Delta foi o que salvou o programa, com isso a Airbus também prejudicaria um concorrente direto. Além disso o Cseries tem um produção bem internacional. A assa é feita na Irlanda e mais da metade dos componentes, incluindo o motor, é feito dos Estados Unidos.
  9. Polícia Federal investiga furto de equipamentos em estação de controle aéreo no DF A Polícia Federal investiga o furto de equipamentos e cabos da Estação de Apoio ao Controle do Espaço Aéreo, da Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB), em Taguatinga. O crime foi registrado na tarde dessa segunda-feira (6). Entre os itens levados estão partes de um rádio telemétrico, que é utilizado para auxiliar aeronaves em aproximação à pista do Aeroporto Internacional de Brasília. O equipamento emite um sinal para o avião, por meio de uma transmissão de rádio, que indica o eixo correto para o pouso. Ao G1, a Inframerica, concessionária responsável pela operação do aeroporto, informou que o crime não causou impacto na operação do terminal. O furto foi percebido por um engenheiro elétrico do Primeiro Centro de Defesa e Controle de Tráfego Aéreo (Cindacta I), do Comando da Aeronáutica. Em depoimento à polícia, ele disse que fazia uma inspeção na estação de controle quando viu que o local tinha sido arrombado e que alguns equipamentos tinham sido levados ou quebrados. Segundo a ocorrência, foram furtados 23 módulos eletrônicos do equipamento de rádio telemétrico (DME), além de cinco placas-mãe, dois módulos eletrônicos e três relés, que fazem parte de um comunicador por rádio. Em nota, a FAB confirmou o furto e disse estar colaborando com as autoridades policias durante a investigação. A Força Aérea explicou também que, apesar da ação criminosa, “não houve impacto no funcionamento da estação”. Fonte: https://g1.globo.com/df/distrito-federal/noticia/2019/05/08/policia-federal-investiga-furto-de-equipamentos-em-estacao-de-controle-aereo-no-df.ghtml
  10. No espólio da Avianca, a briga pela Ponte Aérea O maior ativo da Avianca são seus slots em Congonhas, e o desaparecimento da empresa deve favorecer todos os seus concorrentes, redistribuindo seus 13% de participação de mercado. É por isso que o leilão – desenhado pelo maior credor da empresa, o fundo Elliott – tem despertado paixões e uma troca de acusações entre os principais players do setor. Enquanto isso, o querosene está começando a faltar, e a Avianca corre o risco de parar antes do leilão de recuperação judicial, marcado para 7 de maio. Desde que firmaram um acordo com o Elliott, comprometendo-se a participar do leilão, Latam e GOL já injetaram US$ 13 milhões cada uma para manter a Avianca no ar. Ambas também estão arcando com os custos de acomodar mais de 15 mil passageiros que tiveram seus voos cancelados. Antes do acordo, quando sua proposta estava na mesa, a Azul também injetou US$ 13 milhões. Para minimizar sua queima de caixa, a Avianca devolveu 48 de seus 53 aviões desde o fim do ano passado. Só sobraram os voos da Ponte Aérea, Brasília e Salvador. Se a Avianca parar antes do leilão, os slots serão redistribuídos pela ANAC. Pela regra, Latam, GOL e Azul ficariam com um terço cada uma. A regra também diz que, se aparecer um novo player que não atua no aeroporto, este teria direito a 50% dos slots. Foi este cenário que a Azul quis evitar quando fez a proposta de US$ 105 milhões para ficar com os ativos da companhia no mês passado. Para a Azul, arrematar os 268 slots da Avianca em Congonhas – 7,7% do total – seria a grande chance de colocar os dois pés no mercado mais atraente do país. Hoje a Azul tem 4,9% dos slots de Congonhas mas não voa a Ponte, enquanto a Latam tem 44,6% e a GOL, 42%. Para entrar na Ponte, a Azul diz que precisaria ter frequência e horários de qualidade. A rota Rio-SP garante margens de 20% para as companhias aéreas – e uma eventual entrada da Azul poderia pressionar um pouco essas margens num primeiro momento. Mas, no médio e longo prazos, uma eventual entrada da Azul não significaria preços estruturalmente mais baixos. Estudos acadêmicos feitos no Brasil e lá fora mostram que em aeroportos congestionados há um limite para a queda de preços: a tendência é de acomodação. Para a Azul, a Ponte oferece um outro upside: o acesso ao passageiro business, que tornaria seu programa de fidelidade muito mais atraente. E, da mesma forma, foi este cenário que Latam e a GOL quiseram evitar quando apoiaram a proposta do Elliott, desta fez fatiando a empresa em sete Unidades Produtivas Isoladas – ampliando a concorrência pelo espólio e as chances de recuperação dos créditos. A proposta da Azul, ao contrário, dificultava a entrada de novos competidores. A empresa propôs pagar US$ 105 milhões numa espécie de porteira fechada sem dívidas – mas queria descontar o valor dos empréstimos que fizera e faria para manter a empresa operando – o que deixaria os credores a ver navios. Mas, segundo diversas fontes, seu maior erro estratégico foi não combinar com o Elliott, dono de quase 70% da dívida de R$ 2,7 bilhões, e um parceiro de mais de duas décadas dos Efromovich. Antes de trazer Latam e GOL para a mesa, o Elliott procurou a Azul: pediu US$ 90 milhões – mas David Neeleman não aceitou. A Azul estava disposta a desembolsar outros US$ 130 milhões (além dos US$ 105 milhões), mas apenas para investir na operação, e não para resgatar o credor. A postura da Azul não desagradou apenas o Elliott. Na visão dos Efromovich, segundo fontes próximas aos irmãos, Neeleman trabalhou com as empresas de leasing para asfixiar e tirar as aeronaves da Avianca, em um movimento que teria acelerado o pedido de recuperação judicial em dezembro. Duas das aeronaves do lessor BOC que foram retomadas na véspera do pedido de proteção judicial foram parar na frota da Azul, bem como outras 10 retomadas pela GECAS no mês seguinte. A Azul diz que não é bem assim. Diz que pediu às empresas de leasing que deixassem os aviões com a Avianca pois estava preparando uma proposta pela empresa – e que quando sua proposta foi descartada, os aviões passaram a ser devolvidos mais rapidamente. GOL e Latam se comprometeram a apresentar lances mínimos de US$ 70 milhões cada uma por uma UPI da Avianca – sendo que metade desse valor, já adiantado, vai para o Elliott. Por ajudarem a viabilizar o leilão, Latam e GOL terão direito a um taxa de sucesso caso as UPIs sejam vendidas por mais de US$ 70 milhões. Os interessados podem se habilitar para o leilão até cinco dias antes. Com a Azul sinalizando que está fora da disputa e no cenário provável de nenhum outsider aparecer, GOL e Latam devem ficar com as UPIs. Se isso acontecer, o resultado será uma concentração ainda maior em Congonhas. GOL e Latam aumentariam sua participação nos slots disponíveis em cerca de três pontos percentuais cada. A Azul poderia evitar esse cenário arrematando todas as UPIs, mas a empresa não quer pagar o preço de uma disputa lance a lance em que seus competidores não apenas estariam empenhados em barrá-la, como vão lucrar com o ágio que ela vier a pagar. (Parte do ágio ajudaria a pagar o empréstimo que a própria Azul fez para manter a Avianca operando.) Por isso a Azul segue no jogo, mas aposta em outra estratégia: a de convencer o regulador dos riscos da concentração do mercado para o consumidor. O CADE não se manifestou no processo de Recuperação Judicial, mas emitiu nota técnica alertando sobre possíveis “efeitos extremamente deletérios” ao ambiente concorrencial caso haja uma maior concentração em Congonhas. O CADE pode levar as empresas a abrir mão de slots adquiridos em leilão? “Seria uma decisão inédita no Brasil, mas muito comum nos EUA”, diz Alessandro Oliveira, professor de economia da aviação no ITA. Nas fusões de US Airways com American e da United com a Continental, o Departamento de Justiça americano condicionou a aprovação à venda de slots em aeroportos específicos. Fonte: https://braziljournal.com/no-espolio-da-avianca-a-briga-pela-ponte-aerea
  11. Segundo essa reportagem http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/29/africa/mh370-debris-investigation/index.html a localização do destroço seriam compatíveis com padrão de giro do oceano Índico
  12. Eu não conheço muito o A310, as diferenças de tamanho são consideráveis??
  13. Entenda como satélites concluíram que avião da Malásia caiu no Índico O vice-presidente do operador britânico de satélites Inmarsat, cujos dados permitiram chegar à conclusão sobre a queda do avião da Malaysia Airlines no oceano Índico, explicou nesta segunda-feira à Sky News como foi a operação. O Inmarsat e o Escritório britânico de Investigação sobre Acidentes Aéreos (AAIB, na sigla em inglês) "concluíram que o MH370 voou no corredor sul e que sua última posição se encontrava no meio do Oceano Índico", anunciou a companhia Malaysia Airlines nesta segunda. Para chegar a essas conclusões, "levamos em consideração a velocidade do piloto automático - cerca de 350 nós - e o que sabíamos em termos de combustível e de autonomia do avião para atingir uma série de 'bips' que recebíamos", disse à Sky News o vice-presidente da Inmarsat. Embora os sistemas de comunicação do voo MH370 estivessem apagados, os satélites Inmarsat continuaram a captar, em todos os momentos, os "bips" provenientes do avião. Esses "bips" são enviados de uma estação terrestre para o satélite e, depois, para o avião, que reenvia automaticamente um "bip" em sentido inverso. A empresa Inmarsat mediu o tempo levado por esses "bips" entre o avião e o satélite. "Nós observamos o efeito Doppler que é a mudança de frequência devido ao movimento do satélite em sua órbita", explicou. "Isso nos deu uma trajetória possível para o corredor norte e uma outra para o corredor sul", completou. "Nós reunimos os dados dos Boeing 777 da Malaysia Airlines. Nós os remodelamos e os comparamos com os dados do corredor sul e do corredor norte, e descobrimos que o corredor sul é, sem qualquer dúvida possível, o que foi tomado", explicou à BBC. "Normalmente, você procura triangular os dados e, com frequência, você tem o GPS. Mas, como os aviões nessa região não enviam sinais de sua localização, nós trabalhamos às cegas", acrescentou, na entrevista à Sky News. Ele também considerou que era "tecnicamente possível", a partir de hoje, evitar esse tipo de desaparecimento, enviando a cada 15 minutos pelos aviões - o que custaria muito pouco - "mensagens do tipo SMS com a hora, a velocidade, a distância e a posição". Esse anúncio dramático pôs fim a 17 dias de angústia para os familiares das 239 pessoas a bordo do Boeing, entre eles 153 chineses. A empresa não respondeu, porém, a nenhuma pergunta sobre o cenário que teria precipitado o Boeing nessa região inóspita. Fonte:http://noticias.uol.com.br/internacional/ultimas-noticias/2014/03/24/entenda-como-satelites-concluiram-que-aviao-da-malasia-caiu-no-indico.htm Interessante a parte em que fala que os aviões nessa região não mandam sinal de GPS.
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