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About TheJoker

  • Birthday 01/06/1986

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  1. TP08X não operam mais, estou falando dos 25XX/31XX.
  2. O governo levou anos pra decidir sobre a privatização da TP, a reversão disso não pode ser só uma questão de dias, como já postei acima tem todo um processo jurídico.... E a TP nem sabe/não divulgou o que vai fazer em setembro, em termos de rotas, nem slots em GRU tem...
  3. A TP vendeu 5% pra funcionários, não deu.
  4. Breeze blows inland, slow-rolls launch plans 10 JULY 2020 BY SETH MILLER The newest US airline, Breeze, is taking a delay in its launch plans. The company is also adjusting its fleet plan and service markets in response to changing market dynamics. Rather than pursuing a new operating certificate from the FAA Breeze now intends to purchase the certificate of Compass Airlines. The regional jet operator halted services earlier this year as American Airlines slashed its regional services. But airline operating certificates rarely die; they’re too valuable an asset. By purchasing the Compass cert, but not the associated international route authorities, Breeze can expedite its transition from a theoretical airline to an operational one. Adjusted fleet and route network Previously Breeze planned to lease 28 Embraer E-195 jets from Azul. Now the company intends to launch with a smaller fleet of 15 E-190 aircraft leased from Nordic Aviation Capital (NAC). The company claims the terms on the NAC leases are more favorable and the smaller fleet offers a more manageable growth path and expenses. The A220-300s are still coming as well, though now slated for deliveries starting in late 2021, not at the beginning of the year. That six month delay matches the planned slow-roll of the other service launch. Breeze initially intended to run for three months as a charter carrier before adding scheduled flights to the mix. Now it intends a six month charter run, with scheduled flights not starting until May 2021. Back in February Breeze intended to “introduce scheduled service on three north-south leisure routes in the Eastern United States.” That was to be followed by “more service east of the Mississippi river with flights from existing destinations to points in the Southeast and mid-Atlantic region.” Those routes are now scrapped. Instead the company will focus more on connections between 15 cities in “the Atlantic Coast, the South, Texas, and the Midwest.” Indeed, with the Compass certificate and operations based in Minneapolis, it appears that the new plan will face Sun Country head-on. Or not. There’s no requirement to run flights from the base, though it can ease certain processes. And the proposed timetable suggests a much broader range of cities served rather than a single hub. The revised launch schedule shows several routes crossing time zones, further emphasizing the company’s plans for more Midwest service. And while several of the same city pairs were in the initial details filed in February the revised version reduces weekly frequencies dropping in many markets. Founder David Neeleman previously noted that the operating economics of the E190s offer great economics at a 2 hour stage length. But the costs quickly deteriorate from there. So the shorter hops are mostly what the company will run to start. Indeed, while the original plan anticipated 172 weekly departures and 7:15 of aircraft utilization with 7 active aircraft by month 8, the new plan anticipates 8 active aircraft operating just 164 routes and a 5:52 daily utilization at that same point in the company’s evolution. The lower utilization can be partly ascribed to the shift in operational calendar, with peak travel months not lining up the same. But the overall impact is significant. Adopting the Allegiant model Breeze is not shy about its expectations that the business model will look a lot like that of Allegiant. The company will overfly traditional hubs and operate aircraft in thin markets on a very much less-than-daily basis. With the E190s that model is easy to justify; the capital costs are so low that running the planes less than 6 hours/day can still potentially be profitable. Not only will the planes only fly on shorter routes, but the new theoretical schedule filed with the DOT shows the E190s operating at most 5 days/week. The company plans no service on Tuesdays or Wednesdays, and very little on Saturdays. The Saturday flights disappear in the later months of operation, another nod to the incredible flexibility the airline intends to exert on its schedule. And the not-so-Allegiant model The low utilization operations work well enough for planes that are cheap. That does not apply to the brand new A220s the company plans to purchase. The A220s will spend a month operating on existing short-haul routes when they join the fleet. This presents a good opportunity for the company to grow into the new type and ensure operations remain smooth, while keeping an easy substitute aircraft on standby. But that only lasts a month. By Month 12 of operations (anticipated as October 2021) the company intends to be 50% larger than it was in months 7-10, including transcontinental service between California and the Atlantic Coast on its A220-300s. But with the A220s the finances are a very different matter. For the new aircraft the block times will be much higher and they will fly daily, not just on peak days of the week. They will run a short (~2 hour) trip in the morning on the east coast before a transcontinental route out and back during the day. Indeed, the A220s will have about the same down-time on any given day as the E190s have operating time, based on the filings. https://paxex.aero/2020/07/breeze-airways-delay-shifting-plans/
  5. Boeing in scramble to shore up 737 MAX financing JULY 10, 2020 By Tracy Rucinski, Tim Hepher Boeing is scrambling to shore up financing for the 737 MAX as it awaits regulatory approval for design changes after the plane was grounded following two fatal crashes, industry sources said. Boeing BAN is anxious to resume deliveries once regulators declare it safe and airlines agree training. But confidence in the jet has been hit by the 15-month grounding, making the financing needed to ensure smooth deliveries scarce and compounding a dearth in demand due to the coronavirus crisis. “Nobody wants to take new aircraft and this is particularly true for the MAX right now,” a senior aviation financier said. The value of MAX jets on the aircraft market has fallen by 11% since the start of 2020 and is likely to face more pressure in coming months, depending on the timing of its return, Eddy Pieniazek of aviation advisers Ishka said. With capital markets unavailable after the collapse in air travel during the coronavirus crisis and banks refusing most new business, only leasing companies have spare financing capacity though many are also fighting their own problems, bankers say. Boeing’s strategy, first reported by Reuters last month, has been to encourage lessors to strike deals with airlines to buy MAX jets and rent them back to airlines. In return, Boeing is seen ready to allow the same leasing companies to cancel part of their own plans to buy MAX jets directly, easing pressure on their balance sheets. As a last resort, Boeing stands ready to buy back jets and lease them to airlines itself as a temporary measure through its Boeing Capital financing unit, an aviation market source said. Singapore’s BOC Aviation last month canceled 30 of the jets shortly after it had struck purchase-and-leaseback deals for MAXs with United Airlines and Southwest in what many in the industry saw as related moves. Boeing is now trying to facilitate similar deals for leasing companies to step in and finance deliveries for launch customer American Airlines (AAL.O), the sources said. Previous financing for some of the 17 MAXs that American was meant to receive this year has expired, triggering talks with Boeing, people familiar with the matter said, noting that American was seeking the same pre-pandemic terms. The Wall Street Journal said American (AAL.O) had threatened to cancel some orders unless Boeing helped with funding. Boeing said it would not comment on customer talks. American, which has 76 MAXs on order, declined comment. The loss of a high-profile order from American would deal a harsh blow to the MAX program it helped launch in 2011. Boeing was forced to tear up plans for an all-new plane and agree a faster upgrade to its 737 after American was on the verge of handing an entire 460-plane order to Airbus (AIR.PA). https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-american-airline-b/boeing-in-scramble-to-shore-up-737-max-financing-idUSKBN24B1X9
  6. https://www.presstur.com/empresas---negocios/aviacao/tap-marca-passo-apesar-de-interesse-publico/ Povo é muito mirim AD precisa aprovação dos acionistas (AGE) , marcada pra 10/08 https://api.mziq.com/mzfilemanager/v2/d/ed78542a-4e01-429a-8926-03d69ccfa307/8a94e51a-b483-11e2-808a-db8095a3a1fc?origin=1 Aprovado, o Governo PT precisa pagar DN e AD, e só depois de sacramentado DN e Antonoaldo vazarem.
  7. Quanto ao fôlego, a LTM tinha em 31/03/20, Compromissos de curto prazo (12 meses) $6.3bi Caixa&equiv+recebíveis -estoques -cred imp $2.6bi DIP 3 tranches $2.5bi 5.1bi ainda falta 1.2 bi, deve ser resolvido com devoluções e redução de leasings? E se a pandemia durar + que 1 ano? tem a dívida de longo que também vai precisar de reperfilamento. E isso é pra resolver dívida, operação/folha não está aí...por isso todas as empresas precisam resolver demissões de pessoal de terra & redução salarial de tripulantes, já que pretendem manter 100% com uma operação 50% menor, sabe-se por quanto tempo.
  8. https://airwaysmag.com/airlines/aa-boeing-737-max-order-at-risk/ Possivelmente -17 já construídos e não entregues.
  9. Desde abr20 AD é maior que JJ em termos de RPK, e AD também é maior que G3 no acum abr-jun AD RPK 860 mi G3 770 mi.
  10. https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOT-OST-2020-0105-0001 O 1º pdf é que tem algumas infos de mercado pré-covid https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=DOT-OST-2020-0105-0001&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
  11. Quem sabe se mudar pra NOSSA SENHORA APARECIDA Linhas Aéreas, acontece um milagre.
  12. http://www.latamairlinesgroup.net/pre-merger-information TAM S.A. Lucro (Prejuízo) 2007 R$332 milhões *reapresentado em 2009 2008 (1.434) * idem 2009 1.248 *ajustado em 2010 2010 669 2011 (262) acum. 553 Pós fusao http://www.latamairlinesgroup.net/tam-sa-financial-statements 2012 (1.282) 2013 (1.441) 2014 (357) 2015 (1.323) *reapresentado em 2016 2016 (154) 2017 512 2018 (461) *reapresentado em 2019 2019 704 Acum. (3.802) Acum 2007 a 2019 (3.249) Em 2018, a LTM limpou os prejuízos acumulados (desde a Formação) da TAM S.A. que era de R$7.4 bi. A GLAI tem R$13.3bi acumulados até mar20, a ADSA R$13.7bi. O pessoal precisa entender que pela natureza do negócio, não tem como uma empresa aérea sobreviver com a queda prolongada de faturamento que essa pandemia criou. Interrompeu o giro, as americanas só não entraram ainda no Chapter 11, porque o Governo socorreu, mas isso só até setembro, se não voltarem ao nível de atividade que tinham antes, não tem como rolar dívidas, pagar salários, manter aviões, etc. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/treasury-implementing-cares-act-programs-for-aviation-and-national-security-industries Em junho o mercado doméstico teve 15% do que teve em jun19. Em julho a expectativa é de quase dobrar, vai pra 30%. Agosto deve ficar igual, setembro pra frente só Deus sabe.... 30% só tem mercado pra uma empresa aérea, até vacinar a população e a economia se re-erguer, é a triste realidade. Enquanto isso, funcionários em layoff e tripulantes recebendo 50% do salário. E o mercado internacional tá pior ainda.
  13. https://www.mercadoeeventos.com.br/noticias/aviacao/latam-descarta-pedido-de-recuperacao-judicial-no-brasil/
  14. 17.4bi / 337 aviões = 51.6 por avião em média GLAI dívida em 31/03/20 R$22.4bi / 5,1987 = $4.3bi / 130 = 33.1 por avião AD R$28.5 = $5.5 / 167 = 32.8 Descontando o efeito tamanho de avião, como dizem os franceses....
  15. Em 31/03/20 a LTM tinha USD17.4 bi de dívida ou R$93.4 bi pelo câmbio de hoje. O problema de imediato são $6.3 bi vencendo até mar/21.
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