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Velinho

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    92
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About Velinho

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  • Cidade/UF/País
    Sao Paulo
  • Data de Nascimento
    12/12/1958
  1. Se a aeronave estivesse no PA, não haveria o stab trim querendo subir e descer, pelo que tá escrito no manual... Bem observado MRN, acho que quando escreveram o manual não esperavam que o verbo "must" viraria "should" Mas se houve "briga" do PF com o elec trim, o PA estava fora? Acredito que sim, pois ao comandar o elec trim sws do manche com o AP Engaged deve ser tb uma das outras formas de desacoplar o AP além do sws AP disconect vermelho. O Boeing737 pode clarificar melhor...
  2. Em 2 horas atualizam o sistema, e, basta uma sessão de simulador por piloto reproduzindo a pane na decolagem...Tá tudo resolvido e a vida segue...
  3. Acho que não é só o MCAS que pode ser o vilão disso tudo... Tem muito automatismo envolvido... Concordo 100% MRN Acrescento, muitas informações e alertas conflitantes ( oscilações de velocidade, Stick Shaker e Overspeed warnings) PF brigando com o electrical trim, aeronave acabou entrando numa condição impilotável ( Out of Trim in pitch ) muito parecido com os acidentes do AF e de um outro A-320 em voo de experiencia após revisão na França.
  4. Pós investigação do primeiro acidente, os operadores, no briefing de decolagem, estavam incluindo o item para desativar o eletrical stab trim ( Cut-Out) no caso de unreliable speed? Algum piloto de Max no forum? Só por curiosidade...
  5. Airbus: Hey, I am putting a new engine on A320 and I call this wonder NEO. Boeing: I am doing better and putting a new engine on 737. I call this masterpiece MAX. Boeing’s engineer 1: We have a problem. These new engines are larger than the previous ones. No adequate ground clearance. Boeing’s engineer 2: Easy. Mount them higher and farther forward on the wings. Boeing’s engineer 3: No, we will have a destabilizing effect , especially at lower speeds during high-banked... Boeing’s engineer 2: Don't worry. We have an app, sorry system, for that. It is called MCAS. Boeing’s engineer 4: Good. Let's give training to pilots about this new system. Boeing people 1: No, we promised airlines to minimize the costs of pilot retraining. Boeing people 2: He is right. They will not buy MAX if there is costly and time-consuming training. Boeing’s engineer 4: Oh. At least, let's make them know about it. Boeing people 1: Yeah, somebody prepare a briefing. Boeing people 2: HOORAY. Here is a shiny presentation for the customer. Boeing’s engineer 4: This is insane. Boeing people 1: Relax. We don't hide anything. Everything is written in maintenance manuals. Boeing Engineer 5: Knock knock FAA: Who's there? Boeing Engineer 5: Boeing ODA. FAA: ODA who? Boeing Engineer 5: ODA who does self-certification and whose engineers sign off on their own work on behalf of you. FAA: Here is your certificate. Now, go away. I am listening " I don't care, I love it" song. Boeing Engineer 6: Hey guys, here is the certificate from FAA. European Regulators: Good job. Brazilian Regulator: I don't like you and I don't like FAA. I require that pilots be made familiar with the change. Boeing: Whatever. I married your old girlfriend. After the accidents FAA: The investigation has just begun and to date we have not been provided data to draw any conclusions or take any actions but we stopped listening to that song. I ensure you that we will ground 737 MAXs just as soon as one crashes in the US. -------- I am not saying that this is what happened. Reality is more complicated than fiction. I am saying that it is all Airbus's fault. They started this rat race.
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