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Tópico destinado as discussões sobre o grounding dos Boeing 737 MAX e seus desdobramentos. O antigo tópico encontra-se no link abaixo.

Natasha Frost January 3, 2020 Late in the summer of 1997, two of the most critical players in global aviation became a single tremendous titan. Boeing, one of the US’s largest and most important companies, acquired its longtime plane manufacturer rival, McDonnell Douglas, in what was then the country’s tenth-largest merger. The resulting giant took Boeing’s name. More unexpectedly, it took its culture and strategy from McDonnell Douglas—even its commercial aviation department was struggling to retain customers. Reporting on the deal, the New York Times made an observation that now seems prescient: “The full effect of the proposed merger on employees, communities, competitors, customers and investors will not be known for months, maybe even years.” Nearly 20 years later, one such effect has become the aviation story of the year, or perhaps the decade—the crashes of two 737 Max jets and the loss of 346 lives, not to mention the still-rising associated costs of around $10 billion. In a clash of corporate cultures, where Boeing’s engineers and McDonnell Douglas’s bean-counters went head-to-head, the smaller company won out. The result was a move away from expensive, ground-breaking engineering and toward what some called a more cut-throat culture, devoted to keeping costs down and favoring upgrading older models at the expense of wholesale innovation. Only now, with the 737 indefinitely grounded, are we beginning to see the scale of its effects. “The fatal fault line was the McDonnell Douglas takeover,” says Clive Irving, author of Jumbo: The Making of the Boeing 747. “Although Boeing was supposed to take over McDonnell Douglas, it ended up the other way around.” A turbulent path to an uneasy union Since the start of the jet age, Boeing had been less a business and more, as writer Jerry Useem put it in Fortune in 2000, “an association of engineers devoted to building amazing flying machines.” For a time, this served it well: An engineers’ company made planes to make its engineers proud, whatever the cost. Employees enjoyed watertight contracts, thanks to an assertive, family-like union, and an attitude to aviation that put design and quality above all else. In the process, it produced some of the world’s greatest planes. The 707, for instance, was the first commercially successful jet; the 727, launched in 1963, allowed airlines to reach airports in the developing world or with shorter runways. The company’s philosophy, as one close observer described it to researcher Edward Greenberg, was “go-for-it-and-damn-the expenses—but not damn the quality.” Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the company, and the US aviation industry more generally, found itself in an especially sweet spot, Greenberg told Quartz. It was “the golden age,” he said, “because the airlines—since the government actually controlled where planes could go, (assigning) landing rights in a variety of places—didn’t have competition on those routes. Any costs that the engineers at Boeing wanted to add to the plane—because it was real cool engineering, or made the plane faster or safer—didn’t matter to the airlines and they could just pass on the costs of all of that in ticket prices.” As engineers first, managers second, Boeing’s bosses answered to airlines: The plane that would become the 737, for example, was first ordered in 1964, after Lufthansa boss Gerhard Holtje found a need for a craft that could carry around 100 passengers on short, intercity European routes. By the plane’s third incarnation, in 1981, Boeing was onto a winner. With the dawn of the 1980s, however, Boeing’s traditional way of doing things seemed increasingly out of touch. Deregulation under US president Ronald Reagan had changed the economics of the industry, Greenberg said. “The idea was that if you had more competition, it would drop prices for consumers. Suddenly, airlines are looking at this and saying, ‘Oh my God, we can’t pass on the cost by continuously raising ticket prices.’ That put pressure back on Boeing, and on Airbus eventually, to become cost-conscious.” McDonnell Douglas was in an out-and-out nosedive. As costs climbed, the company’s stock price slumped. Everything seemed to point towards one solution: a leaner operation with more digitalization and a new openness to outsourcing and partnering. At the same time, management was desperately searching for more diverse ways to remain financially aloft. If, figuratively speaking, Boeing was suffering from engine trouble, McDonnell Douglas was in an out-and-out nosedive. The Missouri-based aerospace company was formed in 1967 after the merger of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation and Douglas Aircraft Company. By the 1990s, while its military wing remained robust, its commercial operations were waning. In 1996, Boeing took approximately 60% of the industry’s new commercial aircraft orders. Airbus, the European consortium, lingered far behind it, at 35%. McDonnell Douglas took the remaining 5%. Even its military operations had seen brighter days: The year before the merger, the Pentagon rejected its bid for new fighter jets, turning to Boeing and the Lockheed Martin Corporation instead. Boeing might have been struggling, but McDonnell Douglas seemed destined for failure. In 1996, Boeing acquired Rockwell, a smaller aerospace and defense manufacturer, for around $3 billion. Now, it had its sights on McDonnell Douglas. These decisions, made by Boeing CEO Phil Condit, were made with a close eye on the company’s bottom line ahead of a hotly anticipated commercial-jet boom. An ambitious program of cost-cutting, outsourcing, and digitalization had already begun. For Boeing, acquiring McDonnell Douglas held many attractions. On the one hand, it would be a victory lap of sorts, to finally take over the remnants of its oldest rival. On another, it was a prime opportunity to pick up McDonnell Douglas’ valuable military expertise and diversify its own offerings away from the turbulent commercial aircraft market, with its cycle of booms and busts. And then there was Airbus. In less than a decade, the European company had more than doubled its annual deliveries—an upwards trajectory Boeing executives feared meant the loss of its position as the foremost commercial plane manufacturer in an increasingly expensive world. After the intended merger was announced, antitrust regulators on both sides of the Atlantic considered their options. Airbus and Boeing were already one another’s only significant competitor. McDonnell Douglas’ very existence served a certain purpose—it appears to have made the market more competitive, in helping to drive down prices—but it remained in the doldrums. Regulators noted McDonnell Douglas “no longer [constituted] a meaningful competitive force in the commercial aircraft market,” and that, without a full line of large and small jets, it had no real plan to stave off the “grim prospect” of collapse. Without a takeover, there is every indication that the company might have failed all by itself. The honeymoon period? Eventually, after months of deliberation, regulators approved the match in August of 1997, with four out of five Federal Trade Commission members ruling that it would not “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in either defense or commercial aircraft markets.” Boeing bought the McDonnell Douglas for $14 billion. Shares of both enjoyed a slight bump. Boeing’s new acquisition allowed Condit to move forward on his other key project: diversifying Boeing’s revenue streams. With the lucrative government contracts it picked up with McDonnell Douglas and Rockwell, Boeing’s comparatively fledgling space and defense operations could flourish. In the eyes of many Boeing employees, McDonnell Douglas executives seemed to do disproportionately well out of the merger: Many were given senior positions following the acquisition, with the company’s head, Harry Stonecipher initially appointed chief operating officer and holding more than twice the number of shares in the company as Condit, who remained CEO. Stonecipher and John McDonnell, formerly the chair of McDonnell Douglas’ board, were now the two largest individual shareholders of the merged companies. Stonecipher eventually became Boeing CEO in 2003, but was pushed out in 2005, after an internal investigation revealed that he was having a consensual, but extramarital relationship with a fellow Boeing executive. In a 2007 interview, Ron Woodard, the former president of Boeing’s Commercial Airplane Group, bemoaned the changes the merger brought with it. “We thought that we’d kill McDonnell Douglas and we had it on the ropes,” he said. “I still believe that Harry outsmarted Phil and his gang bought Boeing with Boeing’s money. We were all just disgusted.” More than that, he added, the company had “paid way, way too much money [for McDonnell Douglas] and we’re still paying for it. We wrote off so many tens of billions of dollars for that whole mess.” “If you don’t perform, you don’t stay on the team.” Inside the company, there were rumblings of dissatisfaction. A formerly cosy atmosphere, in which engineers ran the show and executives aged out of the company gracefully, was suddenly cut-throat. In 1998, the year after the merger, Stonecipher warned employees they needed to “quit behaving like a family and become more like a team. If you don’t perform, you don’t stay on the team.” Everything seemed to be changing—the leadership, the culture, even the headquarters, with a move from Seattle to Chicago in 2001. The new location seems to have been especially disorienting for Boeing employees. “There was something about the locus of the company which was unique, that its whole history had almost been written on the same runway from the beginning, at Boeing Field” in Seattle, says Irving. Even the company’s ethos seemed to have changed, he says: “There was a kind of inherent ethic about how you went about designing and manufacturing and flying planes that carried passengers, as opposed to flying military planes.” For the former, you were serving individuals and airlines, interested primarily in the best way to fly; for the latter, you were playing a small part in the US’ global military operations. Meanwhile, increasing shareholder value, once scarcely a consideration, grew to be more and more of a priority. Many employees struggled to adjust, or resented what they saw as a changing of the guard, where investors took priority over passengers. “Many of the engineers happened to be the guys who pioneered the 707, and so took the company into the jet age and there was a kind of esprit de corps among them and an integrity of purpose among them,” says Irving. “And they had a collective sense of what the company was meant to do and what its responsibilities were.” Now, a passion for great planes was replaced with “a passion for affordability.” Stonecipher seems to have agreed with this assessment. “When people say I changed the culture of Boeing, that was the intent, so it’s run like a business rather than a great engineering firm,” he told the Chicago Tribune in 2004. “It is a great engineering firm, but people invest in a company because they want to make money.” How a change in approach led to the 737 Max Two decades on, perhaps the most lasting consequence of the change in culture has been in Boeing’s approach to aircraft building. Cutting costs and diversifying revenue ought to have served as an ideal way to subsidize the expensive process of plane development. Instead, with engineers now disempowered and management far away in Chicago, the actual building of new planes in Seattle all but stalled. Boeing would not actually announce even the plans for a new plane until 2003, with the 787 Dreamliner. Throughout this time, Boeing was led by its first chairman without a traditional aviation background: James McNerney had instead spent almost two decades in management at General Electric—now, he was following a tried-and-tested route of cutting, downsizing, and shifting. That approach was applied to upgrading the 737, which had become the victim of its own success. In its five-decade history, airlines have cumulatively ordered more than 10,000 of the planes—an aviation rock star. But rather than retiring the plane, and replacing it with the next big thing, Boeing instead opted to keep costs down by tinkering and adjusting the model to fit still more passengers. The version it called the Max, writes Irving in the Daily Beast, was the alternative, cheaper solution. “The airlines went for it because the new engines promised higher efficiency and—so it seemed—pilots would find it very simple to move from the [1997 737 Next Gen] to the Max.” “None of the above should have passed the ‘OK’ pencil.” Pilots have long been aware of the plane’s shortcomings. Writing in the engineering industry publication IEEE Spectrum, pilot and software developer Gregory Travis explains how these repeat redesigns have led to recent tragedies. The plane was designed for a time before machine-aided cargo loading and so sits low to the ground to aid ground crews hauling baggage. But as the planes grew larger, so too have their engines. Instead of being hung under the wing, as in earlier models, the engines have been moved forward and upward, potentially leading to an aerodynamic stall under certain circumstances. “Instead of going back to the drawing board and getting the airframe hardware right, Boeing relied on something called the ‘Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System,’ or MCAS,” he writes. Put very crudely, this was a software fix for a hardware problem—and one that was far from perfect. In Travis’ estimation, the software relied on the wrong systems and sensors, without cross-checking them against other easily accessible information from the plane’s sensors. “None of the above should have passed muster,” he writes. “None of the above should have passed the ‘OK’ pencil of the most junior engineering staff.” Light through the clouds? For Boeing, here’s the good news: Airlines are mostly quite profitable—and profitable airlines buy airplanes. The global population able to afford to fly is growing at a staggering pace, which should also mean yet more airline purchases. Boeing may not be the absolute world number one any more, but it enjoys a duopoly with Airbus and is still a preferred supplier for a huge number of airlines. But there’s no denying that the Max has damaged the company. Boeing has now halted production of the plane altogether; earlier this month, CEO Dennis Muilenberg was very publicly fired by the board. Some 400 planes orders are presently on hold, while 387 already-delivered MAX planes have been grounded for months. Early assurances that recertification by the FAA would be easy to come by are now looking decidedly hollow. In the months since the crashes, longtime Boeing customers, such as United Airlines, have turned to Airbus instead—particularly amid fears passengers will refuse to fly the 737 when it returns to service. Having slumped by about 25% after the initial crashes, Boeing’s share price has since scarcely moved. Meanwhile, progress on new planes, including the proposed 797, has slowed as it continue its efforts to work with the FAA on the Max. There are no easy fixes for Boeing. A company that set the standard for jet-age manufacturing is now facing a crisis that goes to the heart of its identity: its ability to build airplanes. Scrapping the 737 altogether would mean the loss of untold billions—not scrapping it may yet cost even more. But if, as seems apparent, the company’s cost-cutters led it down the path towards this mess, its engineers may be the ones forced to bring it back out into the light. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/1997-merger-paved-way-boeing-090042193.html

"Para que fique claro o que estou afirmando, vou repetir: se não for salva pelos contribuintes americanos, a Boeing vai quebrar." (Ivan Sant'Anna, trader no mercado financeiro) Vale a leitura: https://www.seudinheiro.com/apertem-os-cintos-a-boeing-esta-falindo/

Comentário do autor da foto: Shizuoka Airport not only sees off, but you can see many families and spotters visiting on holidays and waving on the plane. Most pilots know this place and pass slowly. On this day, there was a 10th anniversary event of the airport. ANA assigned the Star Alliance livery and was greatly excited. https://www.airliners.net/photo/Star-Alliance-All-Nippon-Airways-ANA/Boeing-737-881/5595843

Do NY Times de hoje, parte da materia sobre os prejuizos da Boeing com o MAX "Already, the tally is substantial. Boeing will take a pretax charge of $5.6 billion in the second quarter, its current estimate of what it will take to compensate its Max-flying customers" Se são 371 aeronaves paradas e outras não entregues, a conta bate provavelmente em mais de US$ 10 mm por unidade. Agora resta saber como a Boeing está comunicando isso a cada cia aérea. Teremos boas novidades no balanço da GOL em breve por exemplo.

Meus prezados Índia começa a avaliar propostas para o contrato de caças de US$ 15 bilhões O Gripen E é um dos concorrentes pelo contrato da Índia A Índia deu um passo em direção à análise das ofertas para a compra de 114 caças, atualmente o maior contrato do mundo em jogo, já que o primeiro-ministro Narendra Modi busca aumentar a capacidade das forças armadas do país e substituir uma antiga frota de aviões de combate. O contrato – avaliado em mais de US$ 15 bilhões – atraiu ofertas iniciais de grandes empresas globais de defesa, incluindo a Boeing Co., a Lockheed Martin Corp e a sueca Saab AB. Pelo menos 85% da produção tem que acontecer na Índia, de acordo com um documento inicial emitido há mais de um ano. A modernização das forças de defesa do país é fundamental para o primeiro-ministro, que não assinou novos contratos importantes de armas durante seu primeiro mandato, apesar de ameaças simultâneas de vizinhos da China e do Paquistão. Um jato paquistanês F-16 derrubou um antigo MiG-21 da era soviética – a base da Força Aérea Indiana – em um “dogfight” durante um confronto militar no início deste ano. Avaliação começa A avaliação das propostas iniciais e a finalização dos requisitos da Força Aérea começaram, disse o ministro da Defesa, Shripad Naik, a parlamentares. O governo também está elaborando documentos iniciais para a compra de tanques e veículos blindados, além de pedir que construtores navais estrangeiros mostrem interesse em fabricar submarinos na Índia, disse ele. Fonte: Bloomberg Quint via site Poder Aéreo 4 jul 2019

29-May-2019 8:36 PM https://centreforaviation.com/members/direct-news/embraer-and-weg-sign-an-agreement-for-technological-cooperation-in-electric-aeronautical-propulsion-475657 Embraer and WEG, two of Brazil's largest high-tech manufactured products exporters, announced today a scientific and technological cooperation agreement to jointly develop new technologies and solutions to enable electric propulsion in aircraft. The partnership, in the context of pre-competitive research and development, seeks to accelerate the knowledge of the technologies necessary to increase the energy efficiency of aircraft from the use and integration of electric motors in innovative propulsion systems. The electrification process is part of a series of efforts carried out by the aeronautical industry aimed at ensuring its commitments to environmental sustainability, as is already being done with biofuels to reduce carbon emissions. “By creating this technological development agreement with WEG, we have combined more than 100 years of innovation from two leading companies in generating knowledge and strengthening the supply chain, as well as increasing Brazilian competitiveness in the global market,” said Daniel Moczydlower, Executive Vice President of Engineering and Technology at Embraer. “Advances in scientific research can make clean and renewable energy a major enabler of a new era of urban and regional air mobility that is more accessible to the population.” The cooperation between the research teams will support the creation of innovative technologies that can generate opportunities for future evolutions of new aeronautical configurations and the possibility of developing new market segments. Initiatives like this, combined with long-term incentive policies, also enhance Brazil's intent to become a world leader in sustainable technologies. “Our powertrain technology, developed over years for tried and tested applications in trains, buses, trucks and boats, and in constant evolution, has paved the way for this exciting scientific and technological cooperation project. Together with Embraer we will work not only to enable the electric propulsion of aircraft, but also to increase the technological capacity of WEG, of Embraer and of Brazil, taking our country to an even more competitive level,” says Manfred Peter Johann, Superintendent Director of WEG Automation. After testing these technologies in the laboratory, an aeronautical platform will be used for integration and testing of complex systems under real operating conditions. A small single-engine aircraft, based on the EMB-203 Ipanema, will be used as the test bed, which will carry out the primary evaluation of the electrification technology. The first flight of the electric powered demonstrator is scheduled for 2020. The proposed scientific development of aeronautical electrification, using a technology demonstration platform, constitutes an effective and efficient pre-competitive research instrument for learning and training, as well as for the maturation of the technologies before they are applied in future products. Embraer is committed to the open innovation model and maintains collaborations with dozens of universities and research centers in Brazil and abroad. Among the highlights are long-term partnerships with institutions such as FINEP, FAPESC, FAPESP, FAPEMIG and Embrapii, which are key to narrowing the gap between the scientific community and industry needs. By establishing strategic partnerships through more agile cooperation mechanisms, Embraer is stimulating knowledge networks to allow a significant increase in the country's competitiveness and the construction of a sustainable future. This press release was sourced from Embraer on 28-May-2019.

When it comes to the New Mid-market Airplane (NMA), Air Lease executive chairman Steven Udvar-Hazy says that Boeing could end up building two new aircraft: one for range and another for optimal economics. "The NMA programme is a huge undertaking," says Udvar-Hazy, often credited with redirecting Airbus's original plans for the A350. He was speaking at the JP Morgan aviation, transportation and industrials conference today. "It will involve new ways of producing airplanes. Boeing knows it has a lot of work to do. With the scars they have from the 787 programme – cost overruns, delays, problems with subcontractors, partners – they are taking a thoughtful approach." While some airlines are keen on range, as noted by moderator Jamie Baker, a senior research analyst at JP Morgan, others are focused on the lowest cost per seat kilometer. The widebody NMA would seat 200-270 passengers with a range of 4,000-5,000nm (7,400-9,300km), aiming directly at the heart of the so-called middle-of-the-market between Boeing's largest 737 Max and smallest 787. "Some of the Asian airlines are less interested in range and more interested in a higher capacity version, delivering the most optimal economic performance," Udvar-Hazy says. "Ultimately, I think it's driving towards two different models. Boeing will have to address which comes first." This is not the first time it has been suggested that the NMA will be larger than just a single aircraft programme. "It's a two-aircraft deal," Kevin Michaels, managing director at consultancy AeroDynamic Advisory said of the NMA on 12 February at the annual meeting of the Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance. "You work out this new business model on the 797, and you take this to the new single-aisle later on." Yesterday, Delta Air Lines chief executive Ed Bastian confirmed the carrier's interest in Boeing's NMA. "Boeing hasn't decided if it's going to launch that aircraft – we hope they will," Bastian told investors at the JP Morgan conference on 5 March. Boeing had planned to make a decision on the NMA this year but recently postponed that to 2020, in a move that took many in the industry by surprise. The airframer maintains that, if it launches the new aircraft, the type would debut in 2025. https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/boeing-nma-driving-towards-two-different-models-u-456401/

6-Mar-2019 12:27 AM Delta Air Lines CEO Edward Bastian stated (05-Mar-2019) the airline is "very interested" in Boeing's New Midsize Airplane (NMA), adding Delta is looking to replace almost 200 757 and 767 aircraft over the next decade. He noted the airline is in discussions "at a very preliminary phase" with Boeing. https://centreforaviation.com/news/delta-air-lines-ceo-airline-very-interested-in-boeing-nma-884816

January 08, 2019 Lightweight, ultra-thin and more aerodynamic wing concept Boeing revealed the newest Transonic Truss-Braced Wing (TTBW), which researchers say will fly higher and faster than the previous TTBW concepts. The new configuration is designed to offer unprecedented aerodynamic efficiency while flying at Mach 0.80. From end-to-end, the folding wings measure 170 feet. The high wingspan is made possible by the presence of a truss, which supports the extended length of the ultra-thin wing. Originally, the TTBW was designed to fly at speeds of Mach 0.70 – 0.75. To increase the aircraft’s cruise speed, the new concept now has an optimized truss and a modified wing sweep. By adjusting the wing sweep angle, the truss can carry lift more efficiently. The end result was a more integrated design that significantly improved vehicle performance. The new changes follow extensive wind tunnel testing at NASA Ames Research Center. For nearly a decade, Boeing and NASA have been studying the concept as part of the Subsonic Ultra Green Aircraft Research (SUGAR) program. The research focuses on innovative concepts that reduce noise and emissions while enhancing performance. https://www.boeing.com/features/2019/01/spreading-our-wings-01-19.page O lançamento do 797 está próximo. Toda vez que a Boeing vem com conceito novo, tipo Sonic Cruiser, é pra chamar atenção pra um novo avião de conceito antigo.

Boeing, Green Africa Airways Announce Landmark Commitment for up to 100 737 MAX aircraft SEATTLE, Dec. 21, 2018 /PRNewswire/ -- Boeing [NYSE:BA] and Lagos-based Green Africa Airways today announced a commitment for up to 100 737 MAX 8 aircraft, evenly split into 50 firm aircraft and 50 options, as the airline gears up to begin commercial operations. The total deal carries a list-price of $11.7 billion, the largest aircraft agreement from Africa, and will be reflected on Boeing's Orders and Deliveries website once finalized. "Today is a historic day for the Nigerian and African aviation industry," said Babawande Afolabi, Founder & CEO, Green Africa Airways. "This landmark deal takes us much closer to our long-held dream of building a world-class airline that will unlock a new realm of positive possibilities for millions of customers. Broadly speaking, this deal is a bold symbol of the dynamism, resilience and soaring entrepreneurial drive of the next generation of Nigerians and Africans." Green Africa Airways, a value airline based in Lagos, Nigeria aims to offer safe, quality and affordable air travel and be a significant contributor to the economic development of Nigeria and the African continent. The new airline has received its Air Transport License from the Nigerian government and is anchored by a group of senior industry leaders led by Tom Horton, former Chairman and CEO of American Airlines, William Shaw, Founder and former CEO of VivaColombia and Virasb Vahidi, former CCO of American Airlines. "Nigeria is uniquely positioned to be the home of the next major value airline. The strategic partnership with Boeing positions Green Africa Airways to expand and improve air travel for customers in Nigeria, and further strengthens the relationship between the United States, Nigeria and Africa," Vahidi said. The airline initially plans to develop the Nigerian market and then build a strong Pan African network. According to Boeing's 20-year Commercial Market Outlook, airlines in Africa will require 1,190 new airplanes as the continent boosts both intra-continental and intercontinental connectivity over the next couple of decades. "The growth potential for air travel across Nigeria and Africa is extraordinary with the airplane fleet expected to more than double over the next 20 years. We are delighted that Green Africa Airways has selected the 737 MAX to serve this expanding market," said Ihssane Mounir, Senior Vice President of Commercial Sales & Marketing, The Boeing Company. "We look forward to Green Africa Airways building their fleet with the MAX and taking advantage of the jet's efficiency and dependability to open new options across Nigeria and the African continent. Boeing will be a trusted partner to Green Africa Airways as the MAX is introduced into their operations and through their long-term success." The 737 MAX is the fastest-selling airplane in Boeing history, accumulating more than 4,800 orders from over 100 customers worldwide. The airplane's superior performance is enabled by the latest technology in the single-aisle market, including advanced CFM International LEAP-1B engines, Advanced Technology winglets, and other airframe enhancements. Fonte: https://boeing.mediaroom.com/2018-12-21-Boeing-Green-Africa-Airways-Announce-Landmark-Commitment-for-up-to-100-737-MAX-aircraft Se quiserem ver a matéria em português, acesse: http://www.cavok.com.br/blog/boeing-e-green-africa-airways-anunciam-acordo-para-ate-100-aeronaves-737-max/

21-Nov-2018 10:42 PM Airline announces decision to renew its fleet with more efficient and longer-range MAX 12 737 MAX 8 jets will replace current fleet and provide up to 16 percent fuel savings Boeing and Caribbean Airlines today announced the airline has chosen to enhance and renew its single-aisle fleet with the 737 MAX 8. The carrier, which has long operated the Next-Generation 737, will take delivery of 12 MAX airplanes in the coming years. The airline commemorated the selection of the MAX during a ceremony featuring national dignitaries, including the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, the Honorable Keith Rowley, and Caribbean Airlines Chief Executive Officer, Garvin Medera. "Boeing has been by our side since Caribbean Airlines was founded twelve years ago using the 737-800. The 737 MAX allows us to continue offering a safe and comfortable experience for our passengers, while significantly improving fuel efficiency and environmental performance," said Medera. "All of these elements position us for long-term success." The 737 MAX 8 – part of a fuel-efficient family of airplanes – will seat up to 160 passengers in Caribbean Airlines' three-class configuration featuring the "Caribbean Plus" Cabin, and provide more than 500 nautical miles more range than the existing aircraft. The airplane incorporates the latest technology CFM International LEAP-1B engines, Advanced Technology winglets, and other airframe enhancements to improve performance and reduce operating costs. Caribbean Airlines projects the MAX 8 will provide up to 16 percent fuel savings compared to its current fleet. The MAX, outfitted with the popular Boeing Sky Interior and designed to be quieter than previous jets, will also offer Caribbean's customers the latest in passenger comforts. "We are honored that Caribbean Airlines has placed its trust once again in the Boeing airplane family and chosen to bridge to the future with the 737 MAX 8. Its selection reaffirms the partnership we have built together with the Next-Generation 737 family," said Ihssane Mounir, senior vice president of Commercial Sales & Marketing for The Boeing Company. In addition to flying Boeing airplanes, Caribbean Airlines also uses Boeing's services to optimize its operations. The carrier participates in the Fuel Dashboard Program, for example, which allows operators to look across their fleet and identify fuel savings. Caribbean also uses Boeing's consumable and expendable material services to ensure it has the parts it needs when it needs it. The 737 MAX family is the fastest-selling airplane in Boeing history, accumulating about 4,800 orders from more than 100 customers worldwide. Boeing has delivered more than 200 737 MAX airplanes since May 2017. https://centreforaviation.com/members/direct-news/boeing-caribbean-airlines-announce-selection-of-737-max-449793

https://www.aeroflap.com.br/boeing-747-100-de-testes-da-ge-realiza-o-seu-ultimo-voo/

No final da tarde de sábado (22 de setembro de 2018), aconteceu o primeiro pouso com o novo Boeing 737 MAX 8 da @voegoloficial na Paraíba. O voo 7702 operado pelo PR-XMB chegou procedente de Buenos Aires às 17h30, e decolou para Buenos Aires com escala em Maceió 47min depois. =D Mais registros de JPA no instagram @spotterinjpa

Compartilho uma foto incrível tirada por Oscar Wistrand do aeródromo de Boeing Field/King County, onde fica a linha de montagem do 737. Alguém tem dúvida de que mercado tem uma grande demanda de norrow body? fonte:

Bom dia, pessoal. Registro recente em CHS, trata-se do primeiro 787-9 da companhia taiwanesa Eva Air. Eu, particularmente, achei muito bonito. Fonte: https://www.airliners.net/photo/EVA-Air/Boeing-787-9-Dreamliner/5205695/L

Um Boeing 737 da companhia aérea russa Utair pegou fogo após pousar no aeroporto de Sochi, perto do Mar Negro, neste sábado (1º). Dezoito pessoas ficaram feridas, entre elas três crianças, informou o Ministério de Saúde da Rússia. O avião, que tinha partido de Moscou, transportava 164 passageiros e seis integrantes da tripulação. Ele patinou na direção a um rio por volta das 3h (horário de Brasília), segundo a France Presse. A aeronave perdeu partes da fuselagem, da asa e do trem de pouso e começou a pegar fogo. O supervisor do turno do aeroporto, Vladimir Begiyan, que foi um dos primeiros a responder ao acidente, morreu de ataque cardíaco no local, de acordo com o ministro do Transporte, Yevgeny Ditrikh. As autoridades iniciaram uma investigação para determinar a causa do acidente. https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2018/09/01/aviao-pega-fogo-ao-pousar-em-sochi-na-russia-e-deixa-feridos.ghtml