Jump to content
Sign in to follow this  
G-NIAL

Acidente com o Sukhoi Superjet da Aeroflot em Moscou

Recommended Posts

Quero apenas saber o quanto de Flight Control tinha naquele avião... falar que a tripulação veio rápida de demais para o pouso e que o avião se incendiou pq os pilotos não esvaziaram os tanques me parece que estão desviando a atenção dos problemas do avião...

  • Like 2

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Crashed Superjet's pitch fluctuated before fatal touchdown

 

18 MAY, 2019 SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

 

Russian investigators have disclosed that the Sukhoi Superjet 100 involved in a fatal accident at Moscow Sheremetyevo was 1.6t over its maximum landing weight, and experienced two impacts in excess of 5g as it bounced on landing.

 

The Interstate Aviation Committee says it has completed an initial analysis of information from the flight-data recorder retrieved from the Aeroflot jet after the 5 May event.

 

Investigators have revealed that the crew received windshear warnings on approach and that the aircraft experienced pitch fluctuations just before the fatal touchdown.

 

Federal air transport regulator Rosaviatsia, in a detailed outline of the flight, states that the aircraft suffered an electrical failure at 8,900ft – about 5min after take-off from runway 24C – while following the KN 24E standard departure pattern for a service to Murmansk.

 

The aircraft’s autopilot disengaged and the aircraft’s flight control system dropped into direct law.

 

Rosaviatsia does not specifically state that the aircraft was struck by lightning, but it does point out that the aircraft was flying within a “zone of thunderstorm activity”.

 

The flight recorder registered disengagement of the autothrottle, and Rosaviatsia says the captain manually controlled the aircraft for the remainder of the flight.

 

Unable to communicate on the approach frequency, the crew restored VHF radio links using the emergency frequency 121.5MHz, and was vectored back to Sheremetyevo while transmitting the squawk code ’7600’ for loss of communication.

 

The aircraft conducted an ILS approach, in manual mode, to runway 24L.

 

Rosaviatsia says the aircraft had departed with a take-off weight of just over 43.5t and that its weight upon entry to the glideslope was 42.6t – which, it says, exceeded the maximum landing weight by 1.6t.

 

As required for the overweight landing, and the direct-law control, the flaps were set to 25°. The crew also upgraded the squawk code to the emergency setting ‘7700’.

 

The aircraft remained largely stable on the approach – performed in a crosswind from the left of up to 30kt – with an airspeed of 155-160kt.

 

As the Superjet descended through 1,100-900ft above ground, the crew received five predictive windshear “go around” warnings.

 

The aircraft began to dip below the glideslope at about 260ft and, at 180ft, a glideslope alert sounded.

 

Thrust was subsequently increased, with the throttle levers alternately advanced and retarded between 18° and 24° as the aircraft descended to 40ft. This resulted in the airspeed increasing to 164kt as it crossed the threshold and 170kt at 16ft from touchdown.

 

As the captain retarded the throttle to idle, says Rosaviatsia, he made several alternating inputs to the side-stick with “large amplitudes” – up to the maximum – which resulted in the pitch varying between 6° nose-up and 2° nose-down.

 

While the aircraft had appeared close to touchdown at about 700m from the threshold, Rosaviatsia says the first three-point contact with the runway occurred at 900m from the threshold at 158kt, when the aircraft experienced an impact of more than 2.5g, and bounced to about 6ft.

 

Rosaviatsia says the aircraft’s spoilers did not deploy automatically. Aeroflot stresses that its procedures do not require the manual deployment of spoilers until thrust-reverse is activated and the aircraft is settled and stable on the runway.

 

“In the absence of a stable course the release of the spoilers was impossible,” the carrier adds.

 

Having bounced, the aircraft touched down 2s later on its nose-gear at 155kt, with a heavy impact of 5.85g, causing the Superjet to bounce a second time, to a height of 18ft. The third, and final, impact occurred at 140kt – reaching at least 5g – and was immediately followed by damage to the aircraft’s structure, a fuel spill and fire.

 

As the aircraft decelerated through 100kt, sliding along the runway, a fire alarm was triggered in the aft baggage and cargo compartment, followed by a fire alarm in the auxiliary power unit 16s later. The aircraft’s PowerJet SaM146 engines continued operating until the end of the flight-data recorder trace just after 18:31.

 

Rosaviatsia says the captain had logged 1,570h on type out of a total of 6,844h while the first officer had 623h on type.

 

The aircraft (RA-89098) had accumulated 2,710h over the course of 1,658 cycles.

 

Rosaviatsia says the fatalities comprised 40 of the 73 passengers and one of the five crew members, while six passengers and three crew were injured.

 

Aeroflot stresses that the preliminary information disclosed by Rosaviatsia does not reference errors by the crew or any violation of procedures, and that final conclusions have yet to be released by the investigating authorities.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

“The aircraft remained largely stable on the approach – performed in a crosswind from the left of up to 30kt – with an airspeed of 155-160kt.

 

As the Superjet descended through 1,100-900ft above ground, the crew received five predictive windshear “go around” warnings.”

 

Com pelo menos cinco aeroportos ao redor de Moscou, tentar uma aproximação em Sheremetyevo nessas condições não parece ter sido a melhor decisão...

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

se ele voltou sem alijar combustível ou melhor gastar (não sei ser suckoi alija), e foi direto para o aero q decolou, acredito que a situação internamente era grave o suficiente de ter q pousar a qualquer custo.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

se ele voltou sem alijar combustível ou melhor gastar (não sei ser suckoi alija), e foi direto para o aero q decolou, acredito que a situação internamente era grave o suficiente de ter q pousar a qualquer custo.

 

Esta é a grande dúvida!

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Alijar não deve alijar... Não conheço nenhum narrow que faça isso...

 

Em relação a ficar no mesmo aeroporto e não ir para outro.... Não sei, ainda não sabemos o que aconteceu com o avião, mas sem comunicações, tempo marginal, sem saber ao certo o que tinham de navegação, poderia não ser fácil cruzar Moscow de um lado a outro (sem falar que lá é cheio de áreas restritas/proibidas, ainda eram abatidos em pleno vôo...)

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Alijar não deve alijar... Não conheço nenhum narrow que faça isso...

 

 

O Superjet não alija combustível, mas há narrow body que possui, como o Boeing 727, além do trio de quadrimotores: Boeing 707, DC-8 e o Coronado.

 

O motivo destas aeronaves possuirem esse sistema é que quando foram projetadas e iniciada a construção, no final dos anos 50 e início dos anos 60, os regulamentos em vigor na época determinavam que no caso da razão do peso máximo estrutural de decolagem e o seu peso máximo estrutural de pouso fosse superior a 105%, o avião necessitava de um sistema de alijamento instalado. Posteriormente, essa regra foi retirada e introduzida a FAR 25.1001, que hoje em dia determina os parâmetros necessários relacionados a incorporação ou não do equipamento de alijamento.

 

De qualquer forma, o padrão de operação dessas aeronaves RJ não se enquadrariam nos velhos regulamentos, como foram os casos do Boeing 737 e o DC-9 de primeira geração, que eliminaram desde o começo a necessidade de incluir esse dispositivo.

  • Like 5

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Aeroflot lambasts governor over Superjet accident claims

 

29 MAY, 2019 SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

 

Russian flag-carrier Aeroflot has sharply criticised comments from the regional governor of Khabarovsk suggesting the fatal accident involving a Sukhoi Superjet 100 was entirely the result of human factors.

 

The Khabarovsk region includes Komsomolsk-on-Amur, where the Superjet assembly line is based.

 

Governor Sergei Furgal, in an interview with regional television channel Gubernia, reassured that Superjet production would not be halted as a result of the 5 May accident.

 

But he claimed that official conclusions stated that the aircraft was in “perfect” technical condition and “fully functional”, and that the pilots made “a number of errors”, due to inexperience or agitation, while returning to land at Moscow Sheremetyevo.

 

“This is 100% human factor,” Furgal stated.

 

Preliminary findings from the inquiry, however, indicate that the aircraft suffered a serious electrical failure, including a degradation of flight-control laws and loss of communications, possibly resulting from a lightning strike.

 

Aeroflot has condemned Furgal’s comments, describing them as a “blatant attempt” to put pressure on the Interstate Aviation Committee – which is heading the inquiry – and to influence public opinion.

 

The airline says it has not received any conclusions supporting Furgal’s assertions over the technical status of the jet, and has challenged him to back up his statements.

 

“[Aeroflot] requests that [the governor] provides documents confirming the published information about the final results of the investigation,” the carrier says.

 

“In the absence of such, Aeroflot demands an immediate and official denial.”

 

Aeroflot says the investigating authorities have yet to obtain results from the inquiry into the accident, which resulted in 41 fatalities among the 78 occupants.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

One-time checks ordered for Superjet fleet

 

04 JUNE, 2019 SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW LONDON

Russian authorities have ordered carriers to conduct a one-time inspection of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 fleet, in the wake of the fatal Aeroflot accident at Moscow Sheremetyevo last month.

 

Federal air transport regulator Rosaviatsia says the work must be conducted "within the shortest possible time", and that findings must be submitted to the authority's airworthiness management department.

 

The work covers such items as a general check of the aircraft's condition, as well as examination of aircraft and engine logs to check performance of maintenance tasks and implementation of service bulletins.

 

It also requires checks of the on-board emergency equipment, including portable firefighting systems, and aids to communication and guidance.

 

Rosaviatsia states that operators should examine the effectiveness of measures to address logged issues affecting flight performance.

 

Investigators are still probing the 5 May accident in which a Superjet 100 suffered a hard landing, after returning to Sheremetyevo with degraded flight controls, and caught fire.

 

Rosaviatsia says a work completion review certificate should be provided no later than 25 June.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Superjet crew may have attempted go-around after bounce

 

16 JUNE, 2019 SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD BY: DAVID KAMINSKI-MORROW

 

Analysis of the fatal Aeroflot Sukhoi Superjet 100 hard landing at Moscow Sheremetyevo indicates that the crew might have attempted a go-around, despite having activated reverse thrust.

 

The aircraft initially touched down some 900m from the threshold of runway 24L, after returning to Sheremetyevo following a lightning strike.

 

But the aircraft bounced and, while it was airborne, the captain activated maximum reverse thrust.

 

The thrust-reverser doors did not deploy, however, owing to the absence of a weight-on-wheels signal.

 

When the aircraft contacted the runway for a second time, the reverser doors started to activate, opening as it bounced again.

 

During this second bounce the aircraft reached a height of 15-18ft and the flight-data recorder shows that, 2-3s into the bounce, the pilot advanced the thrust levers to take-off power and pulled the side-stick into the maximum aft position.

 

"These actions may be interpreted as an attempt to perform a go-around," says the Interstate Aviation Committee, pointing out that the open reverser doors were starting to close.

 

But the thrust did not increase and the aircraft continued to descend after the second bounce, striking the runway hard at 140kt and badly damaging the main landing-gear, which subsequently collapsed. The jet suffered structural damage and fuel spilled, causing an outbreak of fire.

 

Flight-data recorder information indicates a full or partial loss of engine control at this point, although the inquiry has yet to complete an in-depth examination of the engine control unit.

 

Ten seconds after this final impact the thrust levers were "repeatedly" switched to maximum reverse, but the inquiry says this "did not cause any changes" – the engines remained at idle thrust and the reverser doors were in "transit positions".

  • Like 2

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Os Russos são confiáveis para relatórios finais?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Posted (edited)

Meus prezados

Comandante russo pode ser condenado por acidente que matou 41 pessoas

Promotoria alega que pilotos descumpriram procedimentos básicos durante o pouso

spacer.png

Sukhoi Superjet 100 sofreu um grave incêndio segundos após o pouso de emergência

Onze meses após o grave acidente com o Sukhoi Superjet 100, que resultou na morte de 41 pessoas e deixou outras dez feridas, as autoridades russas divulgaram novas imagens do pouso frustrado. O vídeo e fotografias fazem parte do material utilizado durante a investigação pelo comitê de segurança da aviação da Rússia e da promotoria.

O acidente ocorreu em 9 de maio de 2019, no aeroporto de Sheremetyevo, nos arredores de Moscou, quando o voo 1492 da Aeroflot sofreu uma descarga elétrica logo após a decolagem. Ainda que a ocorrência de raios não cause grandes danos na aeronave, os pilotos reportaram uma falha elétrica, considerado usual neste tipo de evento e que nas condições do voo exigia que o pouso fosse realizado o mais breve possível. Pela proximidade com a pista os pilotos optaram por retornar ao aeroporto de origem.

O comandante Denis Evdokimov e o copiloto Maxim Kuznetsov informaram ao controle do aeroporto Sheremetyevo as condições do voo e que iriam fazer um pouso de emergência. A investigação mostrou que o comandante descumpriu uma série de procedimentos de voo, inclusive do manual da Aeroflot, realizando uma aproximação desestabilizada, com um ângulo de aproximação bastante íngreme. O pouso ocorreu acima dos limites do projeto do avião, ocasionando um bounced landing, com consequente hard landing e perda de controle da aeronave no solo. Com a violência do impacto a estrutura sofreu sérios danos, levando a um incêndio que consumiu praticamente toda a parte traseira da fuselagem.

spacer.png

Imagens utilizadas na investigação mostram estado geral do Superjet 100

Após a aeronave a tripulação levou 17 segundos para iniciar o procedimento de evacuação, com a abertura da porta principal dianteira direita e o acionamento da escorregadeira. Após mais 13 segundos foi aberta a porta no lado oposto do avião. As imagens divulgadas na época mostraram diversos passageiros desembarcando com a bagagem de mão e outros tentando fugir das chamas que tomavam conta da cabine. Um total de 37 passageiros e tripulantes escaparam com vida, sendo dez feridos, enquanto outras 41 pessoas perderam a vida.

Os investigadores afirmam que o comandante Evdokimov não cumpriu os procedimentos previstos e foi responsável pelo acidente, sendo formalmente acusado por negligência e ao crime equivalente ao homicídio culposo no Brasil. Caso seja condenado a pena poderá chegar aos sete anos de reclusão.

spacer.png

Acidente fatal deixou 41 mortos. Passageiros que conseguiram escapar evacuaram o avião levando bagagem de mão

A defesa dos pilotos alega que as equipes de emergência demoraram a responder ao acidente, assim como o controle do aeroporto de Sheremetyevo que teve uma resposta lenta em declarar a necessidade de socorro imediato. Além disso, apontam que a pane elétrica dificultou o controle do Superjet 100, que passou a não responder corretamente aos comandando dos tripulantes.

A promotoria afirma que não foram encontradas evidencias que corroborem que houve uma falha nos sistemas de controle do avião ou que as equipes de socorro demoraram mais do que o usual para atender a ocorrência. Por fim, também foi considerado como fator contribuinte as condições climáticas, mas sem ligação direta com o pouso malsucedido.

https://youtu.be/1-6APD-pXe0

Logo após o acidente os investigadores descobriram que milhares de pilotos civis na Rússia podem não ter realizado o curso básico de pilotagem, comprando as carteiras em escolas fantasma. Apenas em 2007 foram mais de 550 licenças obtidas de maneira ilícita.

Por Edmundo Ubiratan – Aero Magazine 16 abr 2020

 

Edited by jambock

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Mu Nickelback sem qualquer base científica...

Difícil acreditar que a "culpa" e somente da tripulação e que teriam forçado um pouso de emergência desestabilizado e fora dos procedimentos sem necessidade nenhuma.

 

Enfim...

 

Abracos

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
On 20/05/2019 at 22:08, Longreach said:

 

 

O Superjet não alija combustível, mas há narrow body que possui, como o Boeing 727, além do trio de quadrimotores: Boeing 707, DC-8 e o Coronado.

 

O motivo destas aeronaves possuirem esse sistema é que quando foram projetadas e iniciada a construção, no final dos anos 50 e início dos anos 60, os regulamentos em vigor na época determinavam que no caso da razão do peso máximo estrutural de decolagem e o seu peso máximo estrutural de pouso fosse superior a 105%, o avião necessitava de um sistema de alijamento instalado. Posteriormente, essa regra foi retirada e introduzida a FAR 25.1001, que hoje em dia determina os parâmetros necessários relacionados a incorporação ou não do equipamento de alijamento.

 

De qualquer forma, o padrão de operação dessas aeronaves RJ não se enquadrariam nos velhos regulamentos, como foram os casos do Boeing 737 e o DC-9 de primeira geração, que eliminaram desde o começo a necessidade de incluir esse dispositivo.

Os 767 o fuel damping/bomba de alijamento é opcional, inclusive pode ser desativado, tem empresas que tem, outras não.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Essas imagens são impressionantes, aterrorizantes....

spacer.png

Uma curiosidade: Esse modelo de aeronave não tem saídas de emergências sobre as asas. Caso tivesse,  será que alguns passageiros poderiam ter feito evacuação por elas? Parece que não... o fogo chega rapidamente até as asas... Trágico demais.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Meus prezados

Atualização sobre o acidente do Sukhoi Superjet 100

O comentário final nos traz uma grande surpresa!

 

 

  • Like 1

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

Sign in to follow this  

×
×
  • Create New...

Important Information

Saiba os termos, regras e políticas de privacidade